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A woman who defends herself against a man's violence is
either a criminal or crazy; our society is very reluctant to
say that she is ever justified.'
It is interesting to note that governors' consciences are
often good guides to injustice; like bird dogs, their pardons
point to questionable legal practices.2

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past two years, an unprecedented amount of attention has been
focused on the problem of domestic violence. The topic first made
headlines in June of 1994, with the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson
and the subsequent trial of her ex-husband, former football superstar
Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson.' As the mainstream media suddenly
"discovered" the problem of domestic violence, it rushed to showcase
"the system's utter failure to protect women.'" In response, an
increasing number of women sought help, at times straining the limited
resources of existing shelters.' By the end of 1994, the federal Violence
Against Women Act6 promised funding for domestic violence
prevention, training for law enforcement personnel and others who deal

1. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE,
AND THE LAW 12-13 (1989).
2. KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 223

(1989).
3. Maria L. La Ganga & Elizabeth Mehren, Simpson Case Compels Nation to Look at
Domestic Violence, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 1994, at Al.
4. Spousal Abuse Goes Public, ATLANTA CONST., June 23, 1994, at A16.
5. See, e.g., Ros Davidson, BruisedEgos and Battered Wives, THE HERALD (Glasgow),
Oct. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File (noting that phone calls to a Los
Angeles-area battered woman's shelter increased 25% due to the Simpson case, and many
women were turned away for lack of space); Maureen O'Donnell, From Comer Bars to Law
Schools, Theories Abound, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at 32 (noting that calls to the
Chicago Abused Women Coalition jumped 20% after Nicole Simpson's murder and were
expected to increase again during the Simpson trial); Jacqueline Shaheen, Helping Victims of
Domestic Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, § 13, at 3 (reporting that the increased number
of women calling New Jersey shelters in response to the Simpson publicity strained the state's
limited domestic violence services).
6. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.). This legislation was enacted as Title IV of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796gg(b)(3) (West 1994). Congress allocated $800 million for fiscal
years 1995 to 2000 in order to combat violent crimes against women. See id. § 3793(a)(18)
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with battered women,8 and a new civil rights cause of action for
victims.9 Yet for all the recent attention to the terrible costs of domestic
violence and to the need for increased preventive resources, relatively
little attention has focused on another aspect of the problem: what
happens when a battered woman fights back against her batterer-and
kills?
A. Battered Women Who Kill
Domestic violence is much more common than was once believed.1°
Although the possibility of under-reporting makes most statistics
suspect, even conservative estimates suggest that women are abused in
twelve percent of marriages, and some commentators estimate that up
to fifty percent of women will be victims of abuse during their lives."
Women kill far less often than men do, but they usually kill their mates
in the course of defending against violent assaults.12 Yet such women
(providing authorization of appropriations); id. § 3796gg.
8. Id. § 3796gg(b)(2).
9. See Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1941 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(c) (West Supp. 1994)). Other recent
developments include the creation of the Clothesline Project, a visual memorial to abused
women, see Kate Folmar, Clothesline Project Brings Message of Violence to Capitol, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 8, 1995, at 40A; the release of American Medical Association guidelines
on recognizing and treating sexual assault and family violence, see Richard Saltus, AMA Issues
Guidelines on Detecting, Preventing Sex Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 1995, at 20; and a
growing recognition of the prevalence of domestic violence among collegiate and professional
athletes, see, e.g., Rick Warner, Football's Violence Can Spill into Private Lives, DETRorr
NEws, Sept. 24, 1995, at A12.
10. Linda L. Ammons, DiscretionaryJustice:A Legal and PolicyAnalysis of a Governor's
Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of IncarceratedBattered Women, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 1,
7-8 (1994).
11. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation,90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1991). This Article addresses the issue of battering in
heterosexual relationships. For a discussion of the complex issue of lesbian battering, see id. at
49-53.
12. GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at xii. In the United States, an estimated 500 women kill their
spouses each year. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 397 (1991). When the
category of victims is expanded to include women with abusive companions, the National
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women estimates that between 800 and 1000 women
each year are charged with murder. See Erich D. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen,
Constitutional Dimensions of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 363, 366 n. 16
(1992). Moreover, although these women usually plead self-defense, they often are convicted
of murder or manslaughter. See, e.g., Charles P. Ewing, PsychologicalSelf-Defense: A Proposed
Justificationfor Battered Women Who Kill, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579, 580 (1990). For
recent estimates of the number of women imprisoned in the United States for killing male
"intimates," see Ammons, supra note 10, at 5-8.
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often have had an extremely difficult time convincing judges and juries
that they legitimately were acting in self-defense. 3
Until the feminist activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s,
domestic violence was not acknowledged to be a widespread-or even
a public-problem.14 Twenty years later, a battered woman still faces
a skeptical legal system: judges who refuse to grant restraining orders
against abusive husbands, police who will not respond to marital "spats"
or enforce restraining orders, prosecutors who refuse to charge abusive
men, and a severe shortage of adequate shelters and counseling
facilities." Yet when fighting back appears to be the only way to
escape continued violence, the battered woman often finds that these
same legal resources are all too readily invoked against her.
For years, advocates for battered women have sought changes in both
the law and the use of public resources to address the problem of
domestic violence. First, they have sought to increase public awareness
of the issue, to increase the resources spent to stop the violence before
it escalates, and to increase legal receptiveness to the woman's requests
for help. 6 Second, they have supported the use of expert testimony in
trials of battered women who kill in self-defense. 7 Finally, and more
recently, advocates have sought to convince state governors to use
executive clemency for those women who repeatedly have been failed
by the legal system."
A few days before Christmas of 1990, outgoing Ohio Governor
Richard Celeste commuted the sentences of twenty-five women who had
been convicted of killing or assaulting their abusive mates. 9 Two

13. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in the
Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 647 (1980) (arguing that gender bias in
the law of self-defense precludes a woman from asserting a self-defense claim). For recent
analyses of domestic violence issues in the law, see Symposium on Reconceptualizing Violence
Against Women by Intimate Partners:Critical Issues, 58 ALB. L. REV. 959, 959-1306 (1995).
14. See Cathryn J. Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a HistoricalAccident
on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 11-12 (1986). The first wave
of public outcry against domestic violence occurred in the mid-nineteenth century. Id. at 11.
However, these gains "were largely illusory," as violence and judicial indifference to the legal
issues of spousal abuse remained largely unchallenged until the latter half of the twentieth
century. Id. at 12.
15. See, e.g., Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and
the DistinctionBetween Justificationand Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 76-87.
16. See, e.g., Barbara K. Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and
Proposalsfor Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 102-08 (1983).
17. See, e.g., Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman
Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545, 588 (1988).
18. See Ammons, supra note 10, at 53.
19. Governor Commutes Women Inmates' Sentences, UPI, Feb. 20, 1991, available in
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months later, Maryland Governor William Donald Schaefer commuted
the sentences of eight battered women."0 Both governors became the
focus of an intense media debate invoking opposing views of justice,
mercy, and gender roles. "Only Guilty of Being Scared," ran one
headline;2 ' "Mr. Schaefer Batters Justice," countered another.2 Were
these pardons "a total betrayal of how the jury system is supposed to
work," as opponents alleged? 3 Or, as4 Governor Schaefer explained,
was it simply "the right thing to do"?
This Article examines the debate over the legitimacy of executive
clemency for battered women who kill.2 I believe that the motivations
behind the governors' actions were laudable, and, for the most part, that
their actions were justified by commonly accepted theories of
punishment. However, there are several obstacles to the public
acceptance of such commutations, reflected in much of the bitter media
criticism. For example, executive clemency, by its very nature, raises
serious separation-of-powers issues. By freeing women who had been
convicted of murder, Governors Celeste and Schaefer set aside the
verdicts and appeared to second-guess the jury system.26 To the extent
that any exercise of executive clemency sets aside judicial
determinations, however, this criticism is not unique to the release of
battered women who kill. Yet despite the inherent usurpation of judicial
power, clemency has long been accepted as a valid exercise of executive
power.27 Unless we are willing to abolish executive clemency in its
entirety, the separation-of-powers argument should not, on its own,
invalidate the governors' actions.
A related problem concerns the timing of the clemency actions. In
Ohio, Governor Celeste took action only after both the Ohio courts and
the legislature had revised the relevant laws to allow the admission of

LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; Lee Leonard, Celeste Commutes Sentences of 25 "Battered"
Women Felons, UPI, Dec. 22, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
20. Ammons, supra note 10, at 3-4.
21. Only Guilty of Being Scared: Ohio Governor Commutes 25 Sentences, Revives
Battered Women Issue, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1990, at B4 [hereinafter Only Guilty].
22. Mr. Schaefer Batters Justice, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1991, at E2.
23. Leonard, supra note 19 (quoting prosecutor Henry Hillow).
24. Governor Commutes Women Inmates' Sentences, supra note 19.
25. Thus far, clemency has been proposed most often for battered women who were
unable to introduce evidence of the so-called "battered woman syndrome" at their trials, or were
prevented from arguing that their actions were taken in self-defense. See, e.g., Only Guilty, supra
note 21, at B4. This Article generally will not address the propriety of clemency for women who
were convicted after caselaw or statutory changes allowed the introduction of such evidence at
trial.
26. See infra part IV.C.1.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
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expert testimony at the trials of battered women who killed their alleged
abusers.2" Had the imprisoned women been tried subsequent to these
changes, they would have been able to present evidence of battered
woman syndrome that was excluded at their original trials-although
none would have been guaranteed an acquittal at trial.29 Unfortunately,
the relevant caselaw and legislation did not apply retroactively.3" By
choosing to review the cases of these women because they had been
unable to take advantage of the new law,31 Governor Celeste may
single-handedly have given the changes retroactive effect, in
contravention of the determinations of the other branches of government.
A different issue is raised by the Maryland commutations, which
occurred before any such legal changes.2 In this context, Governor
Schaefer used executive clemency to encourage legal change and to
invoke the weight of public opinion to pressure the legislature for
action.33 Apparently, the strategy worked; despite the considerable
outcry regarding the commutations, the legislature did change the law.34
Yet the bitter criticism leveled against Governor Schaefer suggests that
it may be preferable to explore alternative means of influencing the
legislative process, short of invoking clemency as a test of public
opinion or to provoke a recalcitrant legislature to take action.
It is my belief that executive clemency is an appropriate means of
granting relief to battered women who kill their abusers, and that such
exercises of the clemency power comport with commonly accepted
principles of retributive and utilitarian theories of justice. These
principles provide a framework for analyzing when punishment or
clemency may be appropriate. Careful attention to the requirements of
such a framework and a careful examination of the Ohio and Maryland
commutations may identify methods of improving the clemency process
for battered women who kill their abusers. Ultimately, my message is
two-fold: (1) state executives both can and should use accepted
principles of justice to justify clemency for battered women who kill,
but (2) there may be ways of structuring the clemency process so as to
lessen the backlash against decisionmakers, advocates, and the women
who receive clemency.

28. See Eleventh-Hour Clemency, TIME, Dec. 31, 1990, at 17.
29. See Ammons, supra note 10, at 54-55 (discussing the arguments made against
executive clemency).
30. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson 1993).
31. See Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part,TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 44.
32. Mr. Schaefer Batters Justice, supra note 22, at E2.
33. Id.
34. Act of May 14, 1991, ch. 337, 1991 Md. Laws 2275 (codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
Crs. & JuD. PRoc. § 10-916 (Supp. 1994)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [1994], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.4

B. An Introduction to Clemency
The clemency power has been described as "an instrument of equity
in the criminal law designed to promote the general welfare by
preventing injustice."35 Historically, American law has recognized
several types of executive clemency.36 A "pardon" is an executive
action that mitigates or sets aside punishment for a crime; it is used
most often to restore the reputation and civil rights of someone who has
led an exemplary life subsequent to punishment.3" "Amnesty," which
usually is granted to a group of people, in essence "overlooks" an
offense because the conduct served to benefit the public good.3"
"Commutation" substitutes a milder punishment for the one imposed; it
does not remove the legal or moral guilt of the offender.3 9 At the
federal level, the United States Constitution vests the clemency power
in the President,' ° and the majority of state constitutions vest similar
powers in the state executive.4 Clemency actions are generally
nonreviewable, and "[r]egardless of the reasons an executive may have
for granting clemency, the scrutiny of this discretionary act will be left
to the political process rather than to the courts."42
Executive clemency, particularly the power to pardon, is by no
means a modem concept.43 Scholars have traced the pardon, and its
sometimes tenuous relationship to criminal justice, back to the
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (the oldest known legal code), and have
documented its use in the Old Testament and in the ancient Greek and
Roman empires." Historically, executive clemency has been used to

35. Ammons, supra note 10, at 25.
36. For a more detailed discussion, see Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained:
Wresting the Pardoning Powerfrom the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 575-78 (1991).
37. Id. at 576.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 577. Although in some sense parole may be the immediate consequence of a
commutation, it usually is considered to be a distinct system. Id. at 578. The last two types of
clemency, of little relevance here, are "remissions" of fines and forfeitures, and "reprieves" (or
"stays"). Id. at 577-78.
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
41. Kobil, supra note 36, at 605. According to Professor Kobil, the clemency power in
29 states rests solely with the executive, with the remaining states vesting the power either
jointly in the governor and an administrative body or in an administrative body alone. Id.
42. See Ammons, supra note 10, at 28-29.
43. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 15; Ammons, supra note 10, at 28.
44. MOORE, supra note 2, at 15. For a historical analysis of executive clemency, including
how justifications for and formulations of clemency have changed over time, see Ammons, supra
note 10, at 25-30; Carla A. Johnson, Entitled to Clemency: Mercy in the Criminal Law, 10 LAW
& PHIL. 109, 111-14 (1991); Kobil, supra note 36, at 583-611; MOORE, supra note 2, at 15-86.
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mitigate unduly harsh systems of punishment.45 For example, in
nineteenth century England, the liberal use of royal clemency served to
soften the harsh system of criminal justice, and very few of the
defendants convicted of the 200-odd capital offenses actually were
executed.46
Yet, by its very nature, the clemency power exists in tension with the
concept of separation of powers.47 In an individual case, clemency
overrides the conclusions of a judge or jury, and often of several
appellate courts. Moreover, when clemency is granted on a "mass"
scale, it may undermine the very structure of the criminal justice system.
These concerns were reflected in much of the public criticism that
followed the Ohio and Maryland commutations, most notably the claim
that Governors Celeste and Schaefer disregarded the jury system and
effectively gave battered women "the right to impose the death penalty"
on their abusers.4"
Part II of this Article describes the obstacles faced by battered
women when invoking the traditional law of self-defense to explain why
they killed their alleged abusers, and explains how expert testimony
regarding the "Battered Woman Syndrome" has been used to counter
some of these problems. Part III reviews the Ohio and Maryland
experiences, including the harsh criticism to which both governors were
subjected, and describes the more cautious approaches taken in other
states. Part IV analyzes the role of clemency under a system of
retributive justice and assesses the Ohio and Maryland actions against
these philosophical criteria. Part V examines some of the reasons why
these actions were so controversial, and suggests some considerations
for improving future exercises of executive clemency for battered
women who kill.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL

The images of battered women that emerge from empirical studies,
clinical reports, and newspaper stories are of repeated physical, sexual,
and psychological abuse:
[T]hese women have been punched, kicked, strangled,
burned, scalded, shot, and stabbed; attacked with guns,
knives, razors, broken bottles, iron bars, and automobiles;

45. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 44, at 112-13.
46. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 17.
47. See Kobil, supra note 36, at 595-97.
48. See, e.g., Janet Naylor, Schaefer Releases Fears,Too, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1991,

at Al.
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and beaten with belts, chains, clubs, lamps, chairs,
wrenches, and hammers. They have suffered cuts, bruises,
lacerations, broken noses, broken bones ... dislocations,
miscarriages, serious internal bleeding, concussions, and
subdural hematomas.49
Despite the fact that a relatively small percentage of abused women
actually kill their abusers, public perceptions have been shaped primarily
by sensationalized stories such as The Burning Bed.5" Contrary to
prevailing misconceptions, battered women who kill their abusers do not
often "get away with murder."5 The reasons why they often are
convicted include the psychological effects of living in a state of
"constant anticipatory terror,"52 the legal requirements of self-defense,
and general societal biases against battered women. 3
A. The "Battered Woman Syndrome"
When faced with a battered woman who has killed her mate, the
prosecutor, judge, and jury may wonder "Why didn't she leave?" After
years of analyzing and treating battered women, Dr. Lenore Walker
identified key elements of a syndrome that helps to explain how women
become entrapped in abusive relationships. 4 Expert testimony about
this syndrome has become an important but controversial means to
explain a defendant's actions to a jury.
First, Walker adapted Dr. Martin Seligman's "theory of learned
helplessness"55 to the situation of battered women. Seligman
demonstrated that laboratory animals subjected to random electrical
shocks continue to behave passively and helplessly when subsequently
given opportunities to avoid additional shocks. 6 Seligman posited that

49. Ewing, supra note 12, at 581. For detailed descriptions of individual cases, see, e.g.,
ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 55-74 (1987) (providing firsthand accounts
of "typical" domestic violence); CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL:

PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 99-142
1, at 1-30.
50. FAITH MCNuLTY, THE BURNING BED (1980).
51. See Naylor, supra note 48, at Al.

(1987); GILLESPIE, supra note

52. GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 131 (quoting Dr. Elaine Hilberman).

53.
54.
525, 525
55.

See Schneider, supra note 13, at 647.
See Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY
(1978).
Walker, supra note 54, at 526 (relying on several studies by Seligman and others). See

generally MARTIN E. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH

(1975) (presenting evidence to support the theory that anxiety and depression grow out of a
feeling of helplessness and that this behavior must be learned).
56. Walker, supra note 54, at 526-27.
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these animals had "learned" that they were helpless, a response that
persisted even when they were given an opportunity to escape.57
Walker theorized that women who repeatedly are abused similarly learn
that they are helpless to change their situations, an attitude reinforced by
stereotypical expectations of how families are expected to behave.58 As
Walker explained, "it becomes extraordinarily difficult for such women
to change their cognitive set to believe their competent actions can
change their life situation."59
Second, Walker described a three-stage "cycle of violence" that,
combined with the effects of learned helplessness, works to trap the
woman in the relationship.' The first, or "tension-building," stage
involves verbal and minor physical abuse, with the woman attempting
to placate her mate to prevent escalation.6 The second phase, the
"acute battering incident," is marked by a severe beating.62 In the third
stage of "calm, loving respite," the batterer is remorseful and
apologetic.63 According to Walker, this third phase becomes the
woman's reinforcement for remaining in the relationship and forms the
basis for her hope that the battering will end for good.' Over time, the
periods of respite become shorter, and the stages of tension and violence
escalate.65 It is within this cycle of escalating violence that the battered
woman kills in order to protect herself.
B. Self-Defense and Expert Testimony
If a woman kills her abusive mate while protecting herself from
66
serious harm, a self-defense claim would appear to be appropriate.

57. Id. at 527.
58. Id. at 529.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 531-32; Ewing, supra note 12, at 582.
61. Walker, supra note 54, at 532; Scott G. Baker, Deaf Justice?: Battered Women
Unjustly ImprisonedPriorto the Enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, 24 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 99, 102 (1994); Mira MihajIovich, Comment, Does PlightMake Right: The Battered
Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253, 1259

(1987).
62. Walker, supra note 54, at 532; Mihajlovich, supra note 61, at 1259.
63. Walker, supra note 54, at 532; Baker, supra note 61, at 102.
64. Walker, supra note 54, at 532.
65. See GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 133 (claiming that the contrition stage is better
characterized as the "absence of tension or violence," and that the respite can never be complete
because the woman must constantly look for the warning signs of returning tension); Rosen,
supra note 14, at 40 n.165 (citing Walker et al., Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7
VT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1982)).
66. Not all battered women proceed on a theory of self-defense. For example, Francine
Hughes, whose story was dramatized in The Burning Bed, was acquitted on grounds of
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Yet for various reasons, battered women often have been denied the use
of this defense. Many legal scholars have blamed the inflexibility of
traditional evidentiary rules and rigid definitions of self-defense 67for, in
their minds, the unjust convictions of battered women who kill.
1. Traditional Self-Defense
The doctrine of self-defense developed as a legal justification that,
in limited circumstances, renders an otherwise criminal act of violence
acceptable.68 In order to limit this potentially widespread sanction of
violence, the application of the doctrine was limited to a narrow set of
circumstances.69 Feminist scholars have charged that these limitations
reflect the development of self-defense doctrine as "a law for men,"
designed to apply to the paradigm situations of sudden deadly attack or
mutual combat.7" Thus, they have argued, the law is unresponsive when
women need to protect themselves. 7 Under traditional self-defense
doctrine, a woman may defend herself only when she reasonably

temporary insanity. Mahoney, supra note 11, at 35.
67. See GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 50-92 (analyzing how the self-defense doctrine
excludes battered women from its application); Rosen, supra note 14 (same). But see Schopp
et al., supra note 15, at 47, 71-73 (arguing that the battered woman syndrome is not supported
by clinical evidence and is not relevant to the issue of self-defense doctrine, although evidence
regarding battering in general and the defendant's history of abuse remain relevant); David L.
Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical
Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 622 (1986) (questioning the validity of Walker's research and
rejecting any application of the research to the law of self-defense). For recent analyses of the
legal issues affecting battered women, see A. Renee Callahan, Will the "Real" Battered Woman
Please Stand Up? In Search of a RealisticLegal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 117 (1994); Deborrah Ann Klis, Reforms to Criminal Defense Instructions:
New PatternedJury InstructionsWhich Accountfor the Experience of the Battered Woman Who
Kills Her Battering Mate, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131 (1994).
The assumption that traditional concepts of self-defense exclude battered women was
questioned in a detailed study by Professor Holly Maguigan, who concludes that the problem
lies not in the doctrine of self-defense, but in how the doctrine is (mis)applied by trial judges.
Maguigan, supra note 12, at 437. In addition, Professor Maguigan charges that the majority of
battered women who kill do so during traditional "confrontations," and not in
"nonconfrontational" ways (such as when the man is asleep). Id. at 397; see also Schopp et al.,
supra note 15, at 47 (arguing that standard self-defense doctrine can accommodate the relevant
evidence of abuse).
68. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTt, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7, at 454-55 (2d
ed. 1986); Rosen, supra note 14, at 25-27.
69. Rosen, supra note 14, at 27.
70. GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 31-49 (referring to chapter entitled "A Law for Men"); see
also Rosen, supra note 14, at 13 & n.1 1 (discussing the difficulties in applying self-defense to
domestic violence). But see Maguigan, supra note 12, at 407-08.
71. See GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 99; Rosen, supra note 14, at 34.
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believes that it is necessary to use force against an imminent and
unlawful threat of harm, and the amount of force used must be
proportionateto the threatened harm.72 In addition, many states require
the defendant to retreat, historically "to the wall," before responding
with force.73
Battered women have had trouble proving several of these elements.
First, traditional self-defense law requires the amount of the defendant's
force to be proportionate to the threatened harm;74 thus, "[d]eadly force
may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that she is
protecting herself against infliction of death or serious bodily harm.""5
Often, however, abusers attack with their hands, fists, or feet, or with
objects not traditionally considered to be "deadly" weapons, such as
chairs, cigarettes, and hairbrushes.76 A woman who uses a gun or knife
in response to such an assault may appear to use disproportionate force,
and may be prevented from arguing self-defense. The traditional concept
of self-defense does not recognize that hands, fists, and feet, not to
mention various household objects, may indeed be deadly weapons when
wielded by an enraged man who is much stronger than his victim.77
Moreover, although many states are moving away from per se rules
prohibiting the use of a weapon against an unarmed aggressor,78 judges,
juries, and prosecutors may retain traditional attitudes.
Second, self-defense may be invoked only when the actor reasonably
believes that the threatened harm is imminent.79 This requirement poses
the greatest problem if the defendant acts when the abuser is not an
immediate threat, such as when he is sleeping (i.e., so-called
"nonconfrontational" situations).8" To require a battered woman to wait
until the attack begins, however, may ignore her experience in the
relationship. For example, the woman may be aware of pre-assault
symbols, such as heavy drinking, that would not signify imminent
danger to outsiders.82 In fact, the battered woman faces almost the
72. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 68, § 5.7, at 454; Rosen, supra note 14, at 34.
73. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 68, § 5.7(0.
74. Id. § 5.7(b).
75. Rosen, supra note 14, at 28.
76. See GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 57-58.
77. See State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (Wash. 1977) (en banc); Rosen, supra
note 14, at 34.
78. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 417.
79. LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 68, § 5.7(d).
80. See Schopp et al., supra note 15, at 64.
81. See GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 68; Schopp et al., supra note 15, at 67.
82. See Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the
Representation of Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 227, 230 (1986); John
Milne, Abuse as Defense Being Mulled, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1994, at 43.
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exact opposite of the traditional sudden attack: "[t]he question is not
whether he will beat her up again but when, and not whether he will
injure her but how badly or whether he will kill her this time."83 A
court that allows the jury to consider past events as part of the
circumstances of the killing, rather than focusing solely on the moment
of the killing, will be more open to battered women's self-defense
claims.84
Traditional self-defense doctrine required the defendant to retreat
from the encounter prior to using deadly force, unless the attack
occurred in the defendant's home (the "castle doctrine"). 5 However,
many jurisdictions invoked exceptions when the aggressor was a
cohabitant or had permission to be in the defendant's home, which
clearly work against a woman who is beaten by her husband or live-in
companion. 6 In addition, particularly at the trial level, the legal
requirements of the duty to retreat are often conflated with the question
of whether the woman could have "retreated" from the relationship
itself.87 A court must be able to separate any applicable duty to retreat
from the broader (and usually irrelevant) question of "Why didn't she
leave?"
In assessing a claim of self-defense, the ultimate question is whether
the defendant's actions were "reasonable."88 The standard of
reasonableness used in a particular jurisdiction is an important factor in
determining whether the woman can obtain a self-defense instruction,
and in determining what evidence is admissible on her behalf. States
usually invoke either an objective or subjective standard of
reasonableness. 9 An objective standard generally asks the jury to

83. GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 68. Ironically, even a history of battering may be turned
against a woman; the prosecutor may argue that because the woman survived previous beatings,
she had no reason to believe that death was likely this time. Id. at 59-61.
84. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 414-16. Jurisdictions which require proof of "immediate"
harm may be distinguished from those with a more expansive definition of "imminent" harm.
Id. at 415-16; see also Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill
Their Batterers,71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 380-81 (1993) (arguing that the concept of necessity can
encompass a broader range of circumstances than "imminent" harm); Schopp et al., supra note
15, at 64-69 (arguing in favor of the concept of immediate necessity rather than imminent or
immediate harm).
85. LAFAVE & Scowt, supra note 68, § 5.7(f).
86. GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 39, 83-84; Maguigan, supra note 12, at 419-20.
87. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 419. As Cynthia Gillespie points out, the woman is under
no legal obligation to leave the relationship. GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 144-45. Furthermore,
some of the most severe episodes of battering, including many deaths, are triggered by attempts
to leave. See, e.g., id. at 150-52; Mahoney, supra note 11, at 65-71.
88. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 68, § 5.7(c).
89. Schopp et al., supra note 15, at 91.
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assess whether the action was one that would have been taken by a
"reasonable man" in the same circumstances. 9' Such a standard,
however, fails to account for the real-life experiences of most women,
let alone those who have suffered repeated abuse:
It is absurd for the law to demand that a woman who is
assaulted conform her actions to a code of manly behavior
on pain of imprisonment if she fails. And it is equally
absurd for the law to say that a woman's behavior is only
reasonable when she behaves like a man.9
Yet even if the standard is phrased as that of a "reasonable woman," the
jury may have a hard time accepting that it is ever reasonable or rational
for a woman to believe she needs to kill her mate.
By .contrast, a "subjective" standard charges the jury with assessing
the reasonableness of the defendant's actions in light of the defendant's
own experiences, including her prior relationship with the batterer.92
Hybrid standards, such as that of the "reasonably prudent battered
woman," also have been suggested.93 In order to deal with the apparent
unfairness of the traditional objective standard, and with the more
traditional biases that the judge or jury may import into any standard,
defendants often turn to the testimony of expert witnesses.
2. Expert Testimony and the "Battered Woman Syndrome"
In the trial of a battered woman who kills, it is crucial for the jury
to receive information about the context of ongoing violence and fear
in which the battered woman acted.9" Although the defendant herself
might appear to be the most persuasive witness," 'most battered women
are terrible witnesses on their own behalf [because they] become
numb.' "" If a woman is too "numb" to be an effective advocate for
90. See

GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 99.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 558-59 (overturning and remanding for a new trial the
conviction of'an injured woman for killing a man who broke into the house where she was
staying and threatened both her and her children). Although not a "battered woman" case,
Wanrow has been cited by battered women who wish to invoke a subjective standard.
93. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 410-12. Professor Maguigan notes that a court's
characterization of the standard may be misleading. Id. at 410. For example, the "objective" test
adopted in New York is not significantly different from the "subjective" Wanrow test. Id. She
also claims that the "reasonably prudent battered woman" standard is similar to the combined
standard used by many jurisdictions. Id. at 410-11. In contrast to many other scholars, Professor
Maguigan actually finds the standard to be less significant than other factors. Id. at 413.
94. See GILLESPIE, supra note 1,at 158-60.
95. Laura A. Kiernan, Battered Women Use Their Fear as a Defense, BOSTON GLOBE,
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herself, expert testimony may be the only way to explain her actions to
the jury.96 Although this strategy has been called a "battered woman's
defense,"97 many scholars are quick to point out that it is not insanity
or even a true "defense" to homicide; it simply provides for the
admission of relevant evidence to explain that the defendant's actions
were reasonable in the context in which she lived.9"
Expert testimony about the cycle of violence and learned
helplessness, which constitute the so-called "battered woman syndrome"
(BWS),9 9 is often offered to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct
was reasonable and hence justified."° Such evidence may help to explain
the woman's response to the killing, and may also be relevant at the
sentencing stage.' Generally, in order to be admissible in state courts,
expert testimony must meet three requirements: (1) the information must
be "beyond the ken of the average layperson"; (2) the state of the art in
the field must be sufficiently advanced so that expertise is possible; and
(3) the expert must possess that expertise." Historically, expert
testimony about BWS has met with resistance on all three points. 3
In response to the legal community's reluctance to accept expert
testimony on BWS, advocates have mounted a two-fold strategy. First,
in the courts, they have continued to offer expert testimony about the
growing body of research on the subject, and have argued for general
acceptance of the testimony."° Second, in the legislatures, they have
pushed for explicit statutory recognition of the relevance and
admissibility of BWS, as well as for reformulation of traditional self-

the woman's testimony, without the gloss of expert "hired guns." Id.
96. Id. However, there is disagreement over the effectiveness of expert testimony.
Compare Ewing, supra note 12, at 585 (concluding that "the testimony does not appear to be
all that helpful") with GILLESPIE, supranote 1, at 160 (attributing the controversy to the fact that
"such testimony has proved to be so effective in gaining acquittals from juries").
97. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 14.
98. See GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 159-60; Rosen, supra note 14, at 43-45 (arguing that
this defense should be an excuse and not a justification like self-defense). For this reason, some
writers have emphasized that advocates must look beyond Walker's syndrome when
representing battered women, and try to make all other possible arguments in support of selfdefense. See Alison M. Madden, Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers:
Finding a Just Forum, 4 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 41 (1993).
99. See GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 157-59.
100. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 82, at 230-31.
101. See id. at 231-32, 236-38.
102. Id. at 235 (citing Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 973 (1977)).
103. GILLESPIE, supra note 1,at 166-71.
104. Id. at 184-85.
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defense law.'
Although no state has approved the creation of a separate "battered
woman's defense," most jurisdictions now allow limited use of expert
testimony.1°6 Some states require the defendant to provide extrinsic
evidence that she acted in self-defense before expert testimony is
admissible, while others require only that a claim of self-defense be
asserted."w The progressive trend is illustrated by the Ohio Supreme
Court, which in 1990 overruled its earlier holding that such expert
testimony was inadmissible.0 8
The legislative route also has met with success in some states. One
example is the state of Maryland, 'which enacted a statute explicitly
admitting "[e]vidence of repeated physical and psychological abuse of
the defendant perpetrated by. . . the victim" and "[e]xpert testimony on
the Battered Spouse Syndrome" in cases of completed or attempted first
degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, maiming, or assault

105. Id. at 185-90. This discussion focuses on the admissibility of expert testimony at the
state level, largely because murder is, with few exceptions, a state crime. Id. at 183-84.
However, the issue occasionally arises in federal court, such as when the murder occurs on
federal property or when the defendant attempts to use evidence of BWS to assert a defense of
duress to a federal crime. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899-900 (9th Cir.
1992). In federal court, the admissibility of expert testimony is governed by the relatively lenient
requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which state that: "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." See Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993) (holding that Rule 702
superseded the earlier admissibility test of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
The few federal circuits that have addressed this issue have held that evidence of BWS is
not relevant to assessing the "objective" criteria for establishing a defense of duress. See, e.g.,
United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1994); Johnson, 956 F.2d at 898; United
States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 930 F.2d 857, 860 (lth Cir. 1991) (refusing to
"substitute... a vaguely-defined theory of 'battered wife syndrome' for the showing of duress
courts have always required to excuse otherwise criminal conduct"). However, expert testimony
regarding BWS may form the basis for a downward departure during sentencing under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. See Johnson,956 F.2d at 898-900 (holding that downward
departure would have been allowed under the Guidelines as a basis for incomplete duress);
United States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857, 863-64 (8th Cir. 1992) (permitting downward departure
based on an incomplete claim of self-defense).
106. Johnson, 956 F.2d at 900. However, creation of a separate battered women's defense
has been considered in New Hampshire. See Milne, supra note 82, at 43.
107. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 429. For a comprehensive survey of each state's
requirements, see id. at 461-78. For an earlier survey of admissibility, see Cynthia L. Coffee,
Note, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning
the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J. FAM. L. 373 (1986-87).
108. See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (1990), overruling State v. Thomas, 423
N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981).
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with intent to murder or maim."° While these developments provide
grounds for cautious optimism, this Article discusses a class of women
largely untouched by recent legal activity: those battered women who
were convicted before the new court rulings or laws took effect.
C. Reform and Response
Before turning to an analysis of clemency efforts on behalf of
battered women imprisoned for killing their abusers, it is important to
note that there is substantial disagreement over the judicial and
legislative approaches described above. The debate involves feminist
theorists and advocates who worry that a "battered woman defense"
ultimately would work to harm women."' In particular, many
commentators are troubled by the learned helplessness component of
BWS, which depicts the battered woman as weak and emotionally
damaged."' Expert testimony focused on helplessness may reinforce
the same sex-based stereotypes that BWS was designed to
counteract." 2 Testimony that depicts a woman as too emotionally
disabled to leave the relationship, if not carefully framed, may suggest
that she was far too impaired to act reasonably." 3 Ultimately, judges
and juries may interpret BWS merely as "a new and excusable form of
female irrationality. ' 4
In addition, the "battered woman" depicted by BWS may not
represent many defendants. Put bluntly, explanations of passivity based
on learned helplessness do not mesh well with the act of killing." 5 As

109. Act of May 14, 1991, ch. 337, 1991 Md. Laws 2275 (codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
10-916 (Supp. 1994)).
110. GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 179-81.
1 11. See id. at 179. The negative connotations of the label also may discourage women
from getting help. See BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK
88 (1989) (noting that women "do not want to be placed in the category of 'battered woman'
because it is a label that appears to strip [them] of dignity, to deny that there has been any
integrity in the relationships [they] are in").
112. See GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 180 (quoting Professor Elizabeth Schneider); Anne M.
Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1994); Mahoney, supra note 11, at 42;
Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive
Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 981-82 (1995).
113. Schopp et al., supra note 15, at 72-73.
114. GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 180; see also Mahoney, supra note 11, at 42 (arguing that
expert testimony has contributed to the focus on victimization that may be understood as
pathology on the part of the woman); Schopp et al., supra note 15, at 93-97 (arguing that BWS
falls within the definition of a psychological disorder).
115. See Schopp et al., supranote 15, at 64 (arguing that "it would be more consistent with
the theoretical and empirical foundations of learned helplessness to contend that battered women
who kill their batterers differ from those who remain in the battering relationships without
CTS. & JUD. PROC. §
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Professor Susan Estrich has noted, "women who arm themselves and
succeed in killing their husbands are, by definition, hardly the 'helpless'
creatures" BWS depicts."' Battered women are caught between
conflicting stereotypes: a woman must appear helpless in order to invoke
BWS, yet the prosecutor may argue that her passivity indicated
unreasonableness-or, even worse, acquiescence in the abuse.'17 Nor
does the syndrome fit the battered woman who has a successful career
and does not appear to be "dependent" on her mate or unable to cope
with adversity in her professional life. 1 As Professor Maguigan has
noted, "[t]he creation of a generalized model of the battered woman, to
say nothing of the battered woman who kills, invites courts to prevent
the fair trials of women who are not 'good' battered women.'. 9
More insidiously, the model generally depicts only the experiences
of the middle-class, white population from which it was derived." °
Women of color, particularly Black women, may not fit the stereotype
of the passive and helpless battered woman.' Sharon Angella Allard
has argued that Black women often are portrayed in the sociological and
criminological literature as "bad" women: immoral, hostile, aggressive,
and exploitable." As a consequence, a Black woman may be seen as
too strong and assertive for "learned helplessness" to be a plausible
explanation for her behavior."2 As Allard concludes, "not only does
the theory perpetuate dominant gender role stereotypes, but it does so
to the exclusion of Black women."'"

killing their batterers precisely because those who kill do not manifest learned helplessness").
116. Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 1430, 1433 (1990) (reviewing
GILLESPIE, supra note 1); see also Madden, supra note 98, at 44-48 (arguing that testimony
regarding BWS may not help to prove the reasonableness of the woman's behavior) (citing
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986)).
117. See Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equalityfor Battered Women Who Kill Men
in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J 121, 144-45 (1985).
118. See id. at 148.
119. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 444-45. Professor Schneider has noted that BWS may be
a double-edged sword: " 'Many battered women lose custody of their children because judges
see them as helpless, paralyzed victims who can't manage daily life. And if a woman seems too
capable, too much in charge of her life to fit the victim image, she may not be believed.' "
Tamar Lewin, FeministsWonder If It Was Progressto Become "Victims, " N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
1992, § 4, at 6 (quoting Elizabeth Schneider, Brooklyn Law School professor).
120. See Sharon A. Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist
Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 192, 200 (1991).
121. Id. at 200.
122. See id. at 195 (stressing the need for an approach which incorporates both race and
gender analysis).
123. Id. at 204.
124. Id. at 200.
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While some commentators believe that the solution lies in changing
self-defense law to reflect the reality of women's experiences, 5 others
believe that the problem lies elsewhere. Professor Maguigan argues that
the self-defense law of most jurisdictions already encompasses the
situations of battered women who kill, and that the problem lies instead
with how existing law is applied at trial.2 6 In her view, recent reform
efforts are not only misguided but actually harmful, because proposed
legislation is often much more restrictive than the common law." 7 She
therefore suggests that the objective standards should be refined to aid
battered
women, without changing the basic content of self-defense
28
law.1

While agreeing with Professors Maguigan and Estrich that selfdefense laws should not be changed, other commentators disagree that
the self-defense doctrine is flexible enough to include battered women,
and instead turn to other models. 2 9 These commentators

have

suggested that a single paradigm is inadequate to explain why different
battered women kill, and urge advocates to look beyond BWS to a range
of other legal theories that could benefit these women. 3 ° One such
suggestion is the doctrine of "psychological self-defense," which would
extend self-defense to a threat of "extremely serious psychological
injury... that significantly limits the meaning and value of one's
physical existence."''
Another suggestion is the definition of
"separation assault" as an "attack on the woman's body and volition in
which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the
separation, or force her to return."' 32 While most of these suggestions
have yet to be adopted, they illustrate the complexity of the problem, as

125. See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 189-90; Rosen, supra note 14, at 56 (advocating
a return to self-defense as an excuse, rather than a justification).
126. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 458; see also Estrich, supra note 116, at 1438-39
(supporting the use of BWS evidence within the framework of current self-defense law).
127. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 453-55. For example, some proposals would limit expert
testimony to cases where deadly force was used and would exclude assault cases. Id.; see also
Schopp et al., supra note 15, at 104-12 (advocating "a rigorous distinction between justification
and excuse by separating self-defense justified by actual necessity from excused mistakes").
128. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 458-60.
129. See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 12, at 587; Madden, supra note 98, at 50; Mahoney,
supra note 11, at 71.
130. See Madden, supra note 98, at 50.
131. Ewing, supra note 12, at 587. But see generally Stephen J. Morse, The Misbegotten
Marriage of Soft Psychology and Bad Law: Psychological Self-Defense as a Justificationfor
Homicide, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 595 (1990) (criticizing the psychological self-defense
doctrine as vague and scientifically unsupported).
132. Mahoney, supra note 11, at 65. Mahoney argues that such a characterization would
be recognizable to the jury while still encompassing the relevant elements of BWS. Id. at 71.
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well as the dangers of creating new stereotypes in an attempt to combat
the old.
III. THE GovERNoRs' ACTIONS
Against this legal background, Governors Celeste and Schaefer took
their historic and controversial actions. Both men acted after personal
contact with battered women, and both acted while their states either
were considering or already had enacted legislation affecting battered
women who kill. The actions in Ohio and Maryland continue to affect
more than the individual women freed; they endure as models (both
positive and negative) for the ongoing clemency movements in other
states.
A. Ohio, 1990
Ohio Governor Celeste and his wife, Dagmar, had a history as
advocates for battered women; when Celeste moved to Columbus to
become Lieutenant Governor in the mid-1970s, the Celestes converted
their Cleveland home into a battered women's shelter." In December
of 1990, his last month in office, Governor Celeste granted sixty-eight
pardons and commutations.M Reportedly at the urging of his wife, this
included a group of battered women convicted of killing or assaulting
their abusers before Ohio revised its laws regarding expert
testimony. '3
1. Expert Testimony in Ohio
In 1981, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that expert testimony
'
regarding the battered woman's syndrome was inadmissible. 36
According to the court, this evidence failed to meet the requirements for
admissibility of expert testimony because: it was irrelevant and
immaterial to the issue of self-defense; it was within the understanding
of the jury; the field was not advanced enough to allow the development
133. Gibbs, supra note 31, at 44. For the development of the battered women's movement
in Ohio, see Patricia Gagn6, Identity, Strategy, and Feminist Politici" Clemency for Battered

Women Who Kill, Address at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association
(Aug. 1994) (on file with author). For a detailed description of the Ohio commutations, written
by Governor Celeste's Executive Assistant, see generally Ammons, supra note 10.
134. See Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST.

L.J. 655, 656 (1991).
135. Id. at 678.
136. State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (Ohio 1981); see also Gagn6, supra note 133,
at 6-7 (describing the advocacy strategy behind the earlier attempt to introduce the testimony).
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of expertise; and its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative
value. 37 Ten years later, after the field had advanced and most other
states had admitted the testimony, the court overruled Thomas. In State
v. Koss,'38 decided in March of 1990, the court found that the battered
woman syndrome had achieved enough scientific acceptance to warrant
its admissibility, and held that: "Where the evidence establishes that a
woman is a battered woman, and when an expert is qualified to testify
about the battered woman syndrome, expert testimony concerning the
syndrome may be admitted to assist the trier of fact in determining
' Koss did not create a
whether the defendant acted in self-defense."139
new defense or justification, but rather admitted the testimony as
relevant to the honesty and reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs." 4
Interestingly, one of the last states to allow such testimony by
judicial decision became one of the first states to permit it by statute,
with changes going into effect in November of 1990141 The new law
expressly recognized that the "battered woman syndrome" was a matter
of commonly accepted scientific knowledge and that the subject matter
was not within the understanding of the jury, and permitted a person
"charged with an offense involving the use of force against another"
who raised a claim of self-defense to present expert testimony "to
establish the requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm."' 42 Neither the decision nor the amendments were
retroactive. 143
2. Executive Clemency in Ohio
Since 1851, the Ohio Constitution has permitted a broad range of
executive clemency. 1 " Written application for clemency must be made
137. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
138. 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
139. Id. at 975.
140. Id. at 974.
141. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, 1990 Ohio Laws 265 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.06 (Anderson 1993)).
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson 1993). Additional amendments allowed
the admission of expert testimony regarding BWS when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason
of insanity. See id. § 2945.392(B).
143. See id. § 2901.06; Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 975.
144. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11, provides in relevant part:
[The governor] shall have power, after conviction, to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, for all crimes and offenses, except treason and cases
of impeachment, upon such conditions as he may think proper; subject, however,
to such regulations, as to the manner of applying for pardons, as may be prescribed
by law.
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to the Adult Parole Authority (APA), which must investigate the matter
and transmit a written report to the governor. 45 The APA may
recommend clemency if "such action would further the interests of
146
justice and be consistent with the welfare and security of society.,
At least three weeks before recommending a pardon or commutation, the
APA must notify the prosecuting attorney and judge of the county in
which the original indictment was filed.'47 The APA report is purely
advisory, and the governor has "recourse to little more than... personal
moral standards, political beliefs, or considerations of expediency" in
deciding whether to accept the recommendation.' 4' A disclosure
provision requires the governor to "provide the General Assembly with
the names of the clemency recipients, their sentence and crime, as well
as the reasons for granting clemency.""
3. The Commutations
Less than nine months after Koss was decided, about one month after
the new law took effect, and approximately one month before he left
office, Governor Celeste ordered the review of a group of women
imprisoned for killing their husbands or boyfriends."m° Ultimately, 120
applications for clemency were received; the APA recommended
clemency in eighteen cases, but Governor Celeste chose to commute
additional sentences.' 5 '
Governor Celeste announced twenty-five commutations on December
21, 1990, explaining that:

The specific procedures to be followed for pardons, commutations, and reprieves are contained
in chapter 2967 of the Revised Code. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967 (Anderson 1993).
145. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.07 (Anderson 1993).
146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.03 (Anderson Supp. 1994). Professor Kobil concludes
that, as in most states, "no meaningful statutory or administrative standards exist in Ohio to
determine when a clemency application should be granted." Kobil, supra note 134, at 670 (citing
NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N CENTER FOR POL'Y RESEARCH, GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES (1988)).
147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.12 (Anderson Supp. 1994). In certain circumstances,
where the victim was present at the court proceedings, the APA must send a similar notice to
the victim or a representative of the victim's family. Id. § 2967.12(B).
148. Kobil, supra note 134, at 671.

149. Id. at 664.
150. Compare State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 970 (Ohio 1990) (decided Mar. 7, 1990) and
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.03 (Anderson Supp. 1994) (effective Nov. 20, 1990) with Dick
Kimmins, Outgoing Governor Commutes Sentences of Battered Women, GANNErt NEWS SERV.,
Dec. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File); Sentences of About 24
Women May Be Commuted, UPI, Dec. 6, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
151. Kimmins, supra note 150.
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I believe these 25 individuals were victims in a profound
way and were prevented from giving evidence ... essential
to a jury's being able to reach a sound verdict .... I do not
believe these women represent a threat to the community.
They will not return to the criminal justice system.
These are all genuine tragedies .... My thoughts and
prayers go out to the victims and their families. But we
can't bring the victims back.'52
Governor Celeste further explained:
These women were entrapped emotionally and
physically.... They were the victims of violence, repeated
violence. They loved these men even though they beat them
and feared them. They were so emotionally entangled they
were incapable of walking away. If I thought they would
be
53
a threat I wouldn't have commuted their sentences.
The women ranged in age from their early 20's to their late 60's, and
some were permanently handicapped as a result of the beatings they had
received.' 54 A few had hired other people to kill their mates.' 5 For
example, one grandmother of three had hired a man to kill her husband
after twenty-three years of abuse left her deaf in one ear.'56 Another
woman was a former pre-school teacher whose husband sexually abused
their thirteen-year-old daughter. 7
The investigations were undertaken by Governor Celeste's aides and
by the APA, which allowed the women to present evidence on their own
behalf.'58 In order to prove that they had been abused, the women
produced emergency room records, police reports, physician statements,
and witnesses.'59 Governor Celeste examined a variety of information,
including the medical records, prior convictions, the APA
recommendations, and the inmates' prison records." ° When Governor
152. Id. (statement of Ohio Governor Celeste).
153. Isabel Wilkerson, Clemency Granted to 25 Women Convictedfor Assault or Murder,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1990, at Al (statement of Ohio Governor Celeste).
154. See, e.g., Bob Lewis, Ohio Law Aids Battered Women, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1991, at
A20; Carolyn Pesce, Ohio's Battered Women: Inmates Hope for Freedom to Start Over, USA
TODAY, Oct. 4, 1990, at IA; Wilkerson, supra note 153, at All.
155. See Pesce, supra note 154, at IA.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Wilkerson, supra note 153, at 11.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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Celeste disagreed with the APA's negative recommendation, he
reviewed the women's files at least twice. 6 ' Governor Celeste
ultimately denied clemency to forty-eight women and sent another group
of cases back to the APA for additional review.162 The final group that
received clemency represented less than one tenth of the women
imprisoned in Ohio, and clemency was granted in less than one quarter
of the cases reviewed.1 63 Because Governor Celeste required the
inmates to serve at least two years before release, four of the twentyfive women remained in prison, and all of the women receiving
clemency were required to perform 200 hours of community service in
domestic violence programs as a condition of release."6 As one
editorial noted, "it is important to understand how modest and narrow
the Ohio governor's action was."' 65
4. The Backlash
Not all observers agreed that Governor Celeste's actions were
"modest and narrow." In fact, the media had a field day with the story,
attacking both Governor Celeste and the individual women.1" The
reaction of one local paper, expressed in an editorial cartoon, is notable:
Lizzie Borden took an axe,
An' gave her mother forty whacks.
When she saw what she had done,
She gave her father forty one,
Not to worry, she was blest...
Her hide was saved by Dick Celeste.1

67

Slightly more tasteful criticism, but no less angry, came from many
local prosecutors and the relatives of some of the victims, who

161. See Leonard, supra note 19.
162. Justice and Battered Women, CHI.TRIB., Dec. 27, 1990, § 1, at 18.
163. Id.

164. Id.
165. Id. Three additional women were granted clemency on January 11, 1991. Ammons,
supra note 10, at 2, 21.
166. Kobil, supra note 134, at 678. But see id. at 678 (discussing reactions in favor of the
decision to grant clemency); Wilkerson, supra note 153, at 1 C"'This is a signal to the rest of
the country that women will no longer permit themselves to be battered and abused by men.' ")
(quoting Dr. Lenore Walker, Executive Director of the Domestic Violence Institute).
167. Kobil, supra note 134, at 678 n.120 (quoting CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 13,
1991, at 2E (cartoon)) (internal quotes omitted); see also Gagn6, supra note 133, at 17 (noting
that "prosecuting attorneys throughout the state condemned the clemencies as licenses to kill and
accused the women of being unfit mothers, alcoholics, and abusive women who picked fights
with their husbands and abused their own pets").
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complained that they had not been notified that the governor had been
considering clemency for particular inmates. 6 s In response, Governor
Celeste claimed that the law did not require him to provide such
notice. 69 Prosecutors also argued that because the Koss decision was
not retroactive, it was not intended to apply to women already in
prison.'7 Furthermore, they argued that even if the women had been
allowed to present evidence of abuse at trial, there was no guarantee that
any of them would have been acquitted.' 7 '
Some prosecutors were skeptical of the entire procedure, claiming
that it was "improper for Celeste to legislate away what a jury has
found."' The case of Asya Cole, who killed her boyfriend, Kenneth
Moore, during a struggle over a gun he held to her head, came under
particular scrutiny.'73 For example, the assistant prosecutor recalled no
evidence of Cole being battered, and the APA disclosed that it had
opposed clemency. 74 Above all, prosecutors argued that the
commutations would induce more women to turn to violence.'75 In the
words of Dennis Watkins, the President of the Ohio Prosecuting
Attorneys' Association, " '[t]he fact that you're battered does not give
you a license to kill.' )1176
Much of the public outcry, however, centered on a later and separate
group of commutations. On January 10, 1991, Governor Celeste
commuted the death sentences of several convicted killers to life in

168. See Leonard, supra note 19.
169. Id. Governor Celeste was nominally correct: under Ohio law, the APA is responsible
for such notification. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.12(A) (Anderson Supp. 1994). Additionally,
only the prosecuting attorney is required to be notified. Id. § 2967.12(A). Notice to victims'
relatives need only be given after they make a formal request. See id. § 2967.12(B).
170. Wilkerson, supra note 153, at All.
171. Id.
172. Leonard, supranote 19 (quoting Ashtabula County (Ohio) Prosecutor Gregory Brown);
see also Sentences of About 24 Women May Be Commuted, supra note 150 ("We hear it in case
after case ....
If there's no proof, it should be looked at with a jaundiced eye .. ") (quoting
Frankin County (Ohio) Prosecutor Michael Miller).
173. See State v. Cole, No. 51531, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1987) (LEXIS, States
Library, Ohio File). Cole was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to a 10- to 25year prison term. Id. at * 1; Some of Celeste's Decisions Drawing Criticism,UPI, Dec. 24, 1990,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
174. Some of Celeste's Decisions Drawing Criticism, supra note 173. A news report also
claimed that many of the women had denied being abused, several had discussed the possibility
of killing their husbands, and two had tracked down men from whom they were separated. See
Tamar Lewin, Criticism of Clemency May Affect Efforts to Free Battered Women, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 1991, at A17.
175. Wilkerson, supra note 153, at Al.
176. Quoted in id. at A1, All.
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prison.'" Although the group included all four women on Death Row,
none of the women had sought clemency as a battered woman.'
Governor Celeste was criticized for failing to file clemency applications
with the APA before issuing the commutations, and failing to give the
APA enough time to investigate this second group.179 Claiming that
this failure violated Ohio law, the new Attorney General filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking to have most of these later
commutations declared invalid. 8 ' However, the original twenty-five
commutations were not included in the challenge. 8 '
B. Maryland, 1991
The backlash against Governor Celeste's actions was not lost on
Maryland Governor Schaefer. Apparently having learned from Governor
Celeste's mistakes, Governor Schaefer opted for what appeared to be a
more limited action. However, the procedures that he followed,
combined with a different statutory context, ultimately exposed
Governor Schaefer to an even greater barrage of criticism and almost
stopped the "mass" clemency movement in its tracks.
1. Expert Testimony in Maryland
Although Maryland's high court had never addressed the
admissibility of BWS, the evidence often was excluded at the trial
level.' Furthermore, the legislation admitting expert testimony in
177. Celeste Commutes Death Sentences of Eight Murderers,UPI, Jan. 11, 1991, available
in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. For a detailed description of the controversy surrounding this
set of commutations, see Kobil, supra note 134, at 679-95.
178. See Celeste Commutes Death Sentences of Eight Murderers, supra note 177. The
commutations included four men, one of whom was on death row for killing a policeman, and
another of whom raped and killed a seven-year-old girl. Id. Only one of the women had been
convicted of killing her husband or boyfriend. Id.
179. Kobil, supra note 134, at 680.
180. Id. at 681 & n.133. Although a trial judge overturned the later clemency decisions and
left the fate of those inmates to the Department of Corrections, the commutations were upheld
at the appellate level. See Wilkinson v. Maurer, Nos. 92AP-674, 92AP-675, 92AP-677, 92AP678, 92AP-680, 92AP-1297, 1993 WL 114448 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1993); Kobil, supra note
134, at 681-82, 686-94.
Several legislators expressed their disapproval by proposing bills to limit the governor's
clemency powers. Bill Would Limit Governor's Clemency Powers, UPI, Mar. 5, 1991, available
in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; Kobil, supra note 134, at 683-86, 694-95. Several years
later, Ohio voters amended the state constitution to provide that the governor's power to grant
commutations, as well as pardons, is subject to regulation. See OHIo CONST. art. III, § 11 (as
amended by 1995 Ohio Laws Hs. Jt. Res. 2, approved by voters Nov. 7, 1995).
181. See Kobil, supra note 134, at 686-87.
182. See Richard Tapscott, Md. Panel Votes Spousal Abuse Bill: Legislation Would Aid
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Maryland was not passed until almost three months after the
controversial commutations. 83 Similar legislation had languished in
committee for several years, but Governor Schaefer's actions gave the
measure new momentum."8 The new law, which passed on May 14,
1991,85 allowed a defendant charged with completed or attempted first
or second degree murder, manslaughter, or maiming, or assault with
intent to murder or maim, to present evidence as follows:
(b) Admissibility ofevidence.-Notwithstandingevidence
that the defendant was the first aggressor, used excessive
force, or failed to retreat at the time of the alleged offense,
when the defendant raises the issue that the defendant was,
at the time of the alleged offense, suffering from the
Battered Spouse Syndrome as a result of the past course of
conduct of the individual who is the victim of the crime for
which the defendant has been charged, the court may admit
for the purpose of explaining the defendant's motive or
state of mind, or both, at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense:
(1) Evidence of repeated physical and psychological abuse of the defendant perpetrated by an
individual who is the victim of a crime for which the
defendant has been charged; and
(2) Expert testimony on the Battered Spouse
Syndrome'
The bill did not change the law regarding self-defense, but merely
allowed the explanatory evidence to be admitted.' 87
2. Executive Clemency in Maryland
The Maryland Constitution gives the governor the "power to grant
reprieves and pardons" and requires that he or she report to the
Legislature when that power is exercised.'88 The Maryland Code
defines several types of executive clemency,'89 and charges the

Courtroom Defense of Victims Who Kill, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1991, at B6.

183. Act of May 14, 1991, ch. 337, 1991 Md. Laws 337 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., Ors.
& JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (Supp. 1994)).
184. Tapscott, supra note 182, at B6.
185. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (Supp. 1994).
186. Id. § 10-916(b).
187. See Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
188. MD. CONST. art. II, § 20.

189. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 4-501(1)-(7) (1993).
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Maryland Parole Commission (MPC) with reviewing and making
recommendations to the governor on applications for pardon, parole of
offenders serving life sentences, commutations of sentences, and
clemency."9 However, upon notifying the Legislature, the governor
"may commute or change any sentence of death into penal
confinement... [or] pardon any person convicted of crime, on such
conditions as he may prescribe, or... remit any part of the time for
which any person may be sentenced to imprisonment.''.
3. The Controversial Commutations
Unlike Governor Celeste,"9 Governor Schaefer had no longstanding commitment to the cause of battered women. Instead, the
impetus for the commutations came when Congresswoman Constance
Morella (R-Md.), who had worked on federal domestic violence
legislation, met with several convicted women in December of 1990.193
Impressed by the inmates' articulateness and convinced that they had not
received fair treatment, Morella persuaded Governor Schaefer to meet
some of the women.' 9'
On January 14, 1991, Governor Schaefer met with five women at the
Maryland Correctional Institute for Women in Jessup.1 9 ' Governor
Schaefer said he was moved by the visit, and admitted that "You read
a newspaper: 'Mary Jones shot her husband.' When you see Mary Jones
and understand how she got there, it is a little different." 196 Although
Governor Schaefer agreed to support the effort for new evidentiary laws
and indicated that he and corrections officials would review the
women's cases and the existing practices in Maryland, he did not
commit to exercising his clemency powers. 97
By February, Governor Schaefer had decided to follow in the

190. Id. § 4-504(b)(3). Before granting a parole release hearing for an offender convicted
of a violent crime, the MPC, upon the victim's request, must notify the victim or victim's family

and may be required to complete an updated victim impact statement. Id. § 4-504(d). In certain
cases, the MPC may be required to notify the sentencing judge as well. See id. § 4-504(e).
191. Id. § 4-513.
192. See supra text accompanying note 133.
193. Thomas W. Waldron & Laura Lippman, Pardonsfor Battered Women Considered,
BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, Jan. 11, 1991, at DI.
194. Id.
195. Janet Naylor, A Reason to Kill? Schaefer Mulls Abuse as a Defense, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1991, at B9.
196. Howard Schneider, Meeting Battered Women Face to Face, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
1991, at B7 (statement of Maryland Governor Schaefer).
197. Id.
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footsteps of Governor Celeste.'98 On February 19, Governor Schaefer
commuted the sentences of eight women, stating that the women had
acted in self-defense and posed no societal threat:
"We think after a thorough review of these [cases] that
it's the right thing to do. They served enough time....
"Do you think I'm sending a message that it's OK to
kill your spouse? No.
"Maryland is just one of the few states that doesn't
allow testimony of past abuse, and it's time for us to get in
step. 199
On the same day, Governor Schaefer announced support for two bills on
the admissibility of past abuse and announced the establishment of a
statewide domestic violence prevention task force.'
Before making his decisions, Governor Schaefer reviewed the cases
of twelve women, including two of the women he met during his
January 14 visit.2 ' Information about the women was provided by
lawyers from the House of Ruth shelter and the Public Justice Center,
a legal services organization. 2" The recommendations of the MPC
were based on "a review of the women's prison and parole files, which
include[d] police incident reports, pre-sentence investigations and brief
prosecutorial summaries of the criminal cases, coupled with the histories
of abuse prepared by the House of Ruth attorneys."" ° However, no
court records were reviewed.2" The sentences of the eight women
were commuted to time already served, but the women had to be
monitored by corrections officers as if on parole for the remainder of
their sentences.2"5 Governor Schaefer agreed to expedite the parole
hearing for a ninth woman, and requested that the MPC again review
the sentences of the remaining three women.2°6
Because only eight women were released, their stories became
relatively well-known. Five of the eight women had been convicted of

198. David Simon & William F. Zorzi Jr., Schaefer Commuted Sentences Without All the
Facts, BALTIMORE MORNING SUN, Mar. 17, 1991, at IA.
199. Janet Naylor, Schaefer to Free 8 Battered Women Who Fought Back, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1991, at Al (quoting Governor Schaefer) (alteration in original).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Peter Jensen, Schaefer, Moved by Tales of Abuse, Commutes Sentences of 8 Women,
BALTIMORE MORNING SUN, Feb. 20, 1991, at lA.

203.
204.
205.
206.

Simon & Zorzi, supra note 198, at IA.
Id.
See Naylor, supra note 199, at Al.
Jensen, supra note 202, at 1A.
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second-degree murder, and the remaining three had been convicted of
first-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or battery.7 On his visit
to the Jessup facility, Governor Schaefer met Mytokia Friend, a former
Baltimore police officer who killed her husband after a five-hour
episode of abuse, and Virginia Johnson, a woman who had left her
husband several times but returned after he tracked her down and
threatened to kill her."8 Bernadette Barnes, who hired a man to kill
her husband for $5000, still carried a bullet that her husband fired into
her head while she slept.2" Eleanor Crabtree endured three years of
abuse, including a poison injection and being held hostage in her own
basement.
4. The Aftermath
As in Ohio, prosecutors quickly expressed their dismay at not being
contacted prior to the commutations.211 Questioning the women's
claims, they argued that Governor Schaefer's actions were imprudent
and at odds with the criminal justice system. In the words of John
Scully of the Washington Legal Foundation, "[iun essence, what the
governor is doing is giving to this certain class of individuals the right
to impose the death penalty on abusive husbands. 212 Some noted that
the legislature had rejected the admissibility of BWS.213 Others argued
that the women released by Governor Schaefer were not typical battered
women, since "one was a private detective, another was a Baltimore
policewoman, and a third was well-organized enough to find and hire
a contract killer to murder her husband., 214 Criticism also came from
relatives of the victims, including some who themselves had been
battered. 215' Florence Steiner, whose abusive ex-husband was killed by
207. Naylor, supra note 199, at Al.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. The other women were: Arlene Ellis, "who struck back as her abuser approached
her with an axe"; Joyce Steiner, a prominent Anne Arundel businesswoman; Juanita Stinson,
who suffered several miscarriages during a 30-year period of abuse; and Patricia Washington,
who repeatedly was threatened by her gun-wielding husband. Id.; see also Laura K. McFadden,
A Matter of Murder and Survival, NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 1991, at 64 (detailing Joyce Steiner's
ordeal); Sandy Rovner, Battered Wives: Centuries of Silence, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1991, at

Z7 (featuring the story of Mytokia Friend).
211. Fern Shen & Howard Schneider, Freedom in a Divided World, WASH. POST, Feb. 21,
1991, at B1, B3.
212. Naylor, supra note 48, at Al (quoting John Scully, Washington Legal Foundation
attorney).
213. See id.
214. Clemency in Annapolis, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1991, at A10.
215. See Shen & Schneider, supra note 211, at B1.
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one of the women Governor Schaefer released, stated: " 'I'm absolutely
appalled.... There was a door there for her to leave.... She could
have walked out the door-I did. I was in that situation with Robert
Steiner, but I didn't choose to shoot him.' "216
The biggest wave of criticism was yet to come. On March 17, 1991,
the Baltimore Sun published an "expos6" claiming that, in at least three
cases, the House of Ruth and state investigators had ignored or
overlooked evidence that contradicted the women's stories. a 7 For
example:
Although reporters acknowledged that Bernadette Barnes
had been severely abused by her husband, they claimed that
Governor Schaefer was not aware that Barnes would have
collected over $20,000 from her husband's life insurance
policies.2"' Reporters claimed that officials were so
appalled by the fact that Barnes' husband had shot her that
they failed to examine her case in detail.21 9
Reporters claimed that Virginia Johnson's accounts of the
killing had changed several times.2 " The state's attorney
also claimed that, while out on bail, Johnson allegedly
accosted a high school student who was a potential
prosecution witness, but that the charges were dropped as
part of the murder plea bargain.22 '
Reporters claimed that there was no evidence that Patricia
Washington stabbed her husband during an attack. 2 In
addition, they reported that Washington consistently had
denied any history of abuse when talking to police,
testifying in court, and undergoing pre-sentencing
interviews.223
The resulting outcry exceeded even that of Governor Celeste's
alleged violation of Ohio clemency law. The Maryland Senate President
was quick to condemn the actions, claiming that "[s]omebody,
somewhere, somehow... should have checked with prosecuting
216. Id. (quoting Florince Steiner).
217. See David Simon & William F. Zorzi Jr., Case Histories Reveal Troubling Questions
About Circumstancesof the Crimes, BALTIMORE MORNING SUN, Mar. 17, 1991, at 6A.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. In what I think is a rather telling typographical error, the reporters dismissed
Washington's allegations of abuse during her "premartialrelationship" with her husband. Id.
(emphasis added).
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attorneys, should have checked with investigating officers" and
judges.' Critics charged that the lawyers who prepared the clemency
petitions had taken the women's stories at face value and had failed to
review facts that had emerged at trial.' z A particularly scathing
editorial claimed that Governor Schaefer had been "hornswoggled," that
he had erred both in taking the advocacy groups' assessments at face
value and in "single-handedly overturn[ing] the criminal justice system
by ignoring the evidence from the trials," and that he had endangered
"public safety by turning loose criminals who belong behind bars."226
'
Governor Schaefer staunchly defended his actions, claiming that he
had reviewed all the relevant information. 7 The Public Justice Center
reported that Barnes' prison file, which was made available to the
governor, contained her admission that she received the insurance
money, as well as her denial that the seventeen-year-old policy
motivated the killing.2" The Center also reported that Governor
Schaefer had seen a presentencing report in which Washington denied
being a victim of abuse.229 However, the Center also stated that such
denials of abuse were common among victims of BWS, and argued that
a great deal of evidence corroborating the abuse had been compiled. 230
Public Defender Elvira White reported that Washington had described
the abuse to her but had refused to testify about it,.23' and a legal clinic
attorney argued that Washington had been confused by the prosecutor's
use of double
negatives when she denied the abuse on cross-examination
232
at trial.
Paul Davis, the Maryland Parole Commissioner, defended the
decision not to review the trial transcripts themselves: "I don't think
police and prosecutors are in practice of seeing things other than guilt

224. William F. Zorzi Jr., Schaefer's Commutations Criticized by Lawmaker, BALTIMORE
MORNING SUN, Mar. 19, 1991, at 1A (quoting Thomas V. Miller, Jr., Maryland Senate
President).
225. See id.
226. The Gov Blunders Again,WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at G2 (editorial). The National
Review was even less tactful, claiming that "in general the battered-women campaign is
powerfully fueled by the radical feminist presumption that all sex is violence, and all men are
brutes. Call in the exorcists." Killing the Enemy, NAT'L REV., Apr. 29, 1991, at 13, 14.
227. Cf. Zorzi, supra note 224, at IA (providing statements from the governor's press
secretary and the Director of Operations and Public Safety).
228. Paul Duggan, Task ForceBacks Schaefer on Battered Women, WASH. POST, Mar. 23,
1991, at C4.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Paul Duggan, Freed Inmate Denied Abuse in Testimony: Schaefer's Review of
Case Questioned, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1991, at B1, B2.
232. Simon & Zorzi, supra note 217.
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or innocence.... In these cases, though, we had to look at the gray area
'
and decide whether to grant mercy."233
Many noted that the trial
transcripts would not contain evidence of abuse-because that was
precisely the evidence that had been excluded at trial." However,
Governor Schaefer admitted that a review of the procedures was in
order, saying "We'll look it over. We'll get a better process.
In the midst of this controversy, Governor Schaefer still had to deal
with the remaining four women, whose cases he had remanded to the
MPC. On March 20, the Baltimore Sun reported that state investigators
were questioning judges and prosecutors, thus doing a more
comprehensive investigation than in the previous cases. 36 State
officials denied that the investigations differed significantly from those
done earlier. 37 Instead, they explained, the earlier MPC protocol had
not required such checks.238
Because the four remaining women had been rejected under that
earlier protocol, a more comprehensive "executive clemency
investigation protocol," used by the Division of Parole and Probation,
had been used. 39 Prosecutors expressed satisfaction over being
contacted under the newer protocol but were skeptical of the state's
official explanation.' 4 As one courthouse official noted, "Hey, let's face
it. They don't want any more surprises." 41 On June 27, Governor
Schaefer stated that he planned to order the release of two of the four
women and continue the review of a third case. 42 The fourth woman
was not released because she had been permitted to testify about abuse
at her recent resentencing.2 43

233. Geraldine Baum, Should These Women Have Gone Free?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991,
at El, E2.
234. See id.
235. Tom Bowman & John W. Frece, Schaefer Launches Review of Commutation Process,
BALTIMORE MORNING SUN, Mar. 21, 1991, at IA. As in Ohio, a bill was introduced to restrict
future commutations for people sentenced to life imprisonment by requiring the governor to
solicit the recommendations of prosecutors and judges and to publish notice of his intent to
commute a sentence. Id.
236. David Simon & William F. Zorzi Jr., Md. ProbingMore Deeply in 4 Commutation
Cases, BALTIMORE MORNING SUN, Mar. 20, 1991, at 1A.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. However, there was no clear explanation about why this protocol was not used
originally. See id.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. Howard Schneider & Fern Shen, Schaefer to Free 2 Inmates; "No Doubt" in Cases
of Battered Spouses, WASH. POST, June 28, 1991, at BI.
243. See id.
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C. Action in Other States
Although Ohio and Maryland have been the only two states to
engage in so-called "mass" clemency, other states have examined the
issue. Governors and legislators in Massachusetts, Illinois, Texas, and
California have taken steps to review the cases of battered women, and
clemency occasionally has been granted for battered women in other
states. At the same time, advocacy groups increasingly have urged that
large-scale clemency efforts be undertaken.
1. Massachusetts
The clemency movement in Massachusetts started soon after the
Ohio and Maryland actions. In early September of 1991, the Boston
Globe urged Governor William Weld to review the cases of women
incarcerated for killing abusive husbands or boyfriends.' Advocates
had long noted that the sentences imposed on battered women convicted
of killing their abusers in Massachusetts seemed particularly harsh.24
In fact, Lenore Walker claimed that "[t]he average length of time a
woman today spends in prison for killing her husband in this country is
2 1/2 years. In this state, you can't even think about getting her out until
she spends 10 years."'
On September 26, Governor Weld responded by issuing new
advisory commutation guidelines for battered women seeking
release. 7 Acknowledging that commutation was both "an
extraordinary remedy and.., an integral part of the correctional
process," Weld established a "uniform policy" for petitions.4 In
relevant part, it required the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that "further incarceration would constitute gross unfairness
because of the basic equities involved including... (iii) a history of
abuse suffered by the petitioner at the hands of the victim which

244. Women Doubly Victimized, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 5, 1991, at 16 (calling for the
Massachusetts governor to pardon ten women who were imprisoned for killing abusive husbands
or boyfriends).
245. Stan Grossfeld, "Safer" and in Jail: Women Who Kill Their Batterers, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1991, at Metro/Region 1.
246. Id.
247. Frank Phillips, Weld Relaxes Prison Appeal by Battered Women, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 27, 1991, at Metro/Region 17.
248. COMMUTATION GUIDELINES AND PETITION (1)(c)(iii) (issued by Governor Weld, Sept.
1991) [hereinafter COMMUTATION GUIDELINES]. For detailed information regarding the clemency
process in Massachusetts, see generally LISA SHEEHY ET AL., COMMUTATION FOR WOMEN WHO
DEFENDED THEMSELVES AGAINST ABUSIVE PARTNERS: AN ADVOCACY MANUAL AND GUIDE
TO LEGAL ISSUES (1991).
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significantly contributed to or brought about the offense. 2 49 But the
guidelines also provided that in cases of first degree murder, the
governor generally would not consider a petition until fifteen years had
been served."
Under the revised guidelines, the Advisory Board of Pardons (Board)
is required to notify the victim or victim's family prior to any public
hearing on the clemency petition.251 In homicide cases, the Board must
publish notice of the hearing in a local newspaper. 2 The Board's
report and recommendation must include, inter alia, a copy of the
published notice, a summary of the evidence presented at the public
hearing, an institutional progress report, a description of appropriate
community correctional and parole programs, and a plan for
"reintegrating [the] petitioner into normal community life."253
'
Governor Weld's move marked the first time that a state actually had
altered official commutation guidelines in response to the plight of
battered women."
By the time the Board held its first clemency hearings in July of
1992, eight women, known as the "Framingham Eight" because they all
had been housed in the female state prison in Framingham,
Massachusetts, had sought clemency. 5 At least five of the women
have since been released from prison, either via sentence commutation
or parole. 5 6 The women also have gained widespread media coverage

249. COMMUTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 248, § l(c)(iii).
250. Id. § 3.
251. Id. § 5(h).
252. Id. § 5(c).
253. Id. § 6(a)-(e).
254. See Phillips, supra note 247, at 17.
255. Toni Locy, Prosecutor Urges Board to Reject Commutation Plea, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 29, 1992, at Metro/Region 16; Toni Locy, Pardon Board Hears First Tale of Abuse,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 28, 1992, at Metro/Region 1 (stating that Elaine Hyde, who plead guilty
to manslaughter in the stabbing death of her husband, was the first to have a hearing); Toni
Locy, Weld Urged to Free 8 Women; Commutations Sought for Inmates Who Killed Alleged
Abusers, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 1992, at Metro/Region 15. The Boston Globe, the preeminent
local newspaper, also supported clemency. See Free the Framingham Eight, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 11, 1992, at 22.
256. See Toni Locy, Woman's Life Sentence Is Commuted, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 1993,
at Metro/Region I (reporting that Eugenia Moore was first woman to have sentence commuted
by the Governor's Council); Shawn M. Terry, Women Hold March Against Domestic Violence,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 1994, at Metro/Region 22 (stating that Shannon Booker was released
in June, although it is unclear whether by commutation or parole); Three Down, Five to Go,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1993, at 18 (reporting that Patricia Allen's manslaughter sentence was
commuted and Meekah Scott, who was out of prison pending an appeal, had her sentence
reduced to time served); Woman Gets Parolein Murder of Husband, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26,
1994, at 19 (Elaine Hyde). The Board voted against clemency for both Debra Reid, the lone
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for their continuing clemency efforts even after release, including a
profile on the television newsmagazine Turning Point."
In addition to this encouraging exercise, of executive clemency,
Massachusetts has made recent progress in both the legislative and
judicial arenas. In 1993, the Legislature passed a new law admitting
evidence that the defendant had suffered abuse or harm and expert
testimony concerning the patterns and effects of abusive relationships in
cases where self-defense, defense of others, duress, coercion, or accident
are raised as defenses.258 Moreover, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court recently held that women on trial for killing their alleged
abusers may present evidence of past abuse, as well as expert testimony
regarding BWS. 9 Under this ruling, women may have an avenue to
challenge their convictions if such evidence was excluded at trial.2"
2. Illinois
The clemency movement in Illinois has resulted in several successful
petitions for release. Even before the start of an organized clemency
movement, several battered women in the state had received individual
grants of clemency.261 The Illinois Clemency Project for Battered
Women, composed of lawyers, law professors, law students, and
lesbian among the Framingham Eight, and Patricia Hennessy. See Doris S. Wong, Board Urges
Clemency for 2 in Cases Tied to Battered Women's Syndrome, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 4, 1994,
at Metro/Region 35. However, Reid eventually won her freedom when she was paroled in 1994.
See "FraminghamEight" Inmate Wins Parole,BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1994, at Metro/Region
30. It is not clear what happened to the eighth woman. It appears that the Board's task was
made easier by the fact that several of the women were eligible for parole by the time the Board
examined their petitions. For a description of the Massachusetts clemency procedure, and an
account of Patricia Allen's case, see Mary E. Greenwald & Mary-Ellen Manning, When Mercy
Seasons Justice: Commutationfor Battered Women Who Kill, 38 BOSTON B.J. 3 (1994).
257. See Bruce McCabe, "Turning Point" Looks at "FraminghamEight," BOSTON GLOBE,
July 20, 1994, at Living 30.
258. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 23E (Supp. 1994).
259. Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 633 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Mass. 1994); John Ellement,
SJC Says Courts Must Consider Abuse Defense, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 1994, at
Metro/Region 1.
260. Rodriquez, 633 N.E.2d at 1042. However, the court explicitly declined to speculate
whether the statute applies retroactively to crimes occurring before its effective date of April 14,
1994. Id. at 1042 n.7.
261. For example, Governor Jim Edgar released Denise Babula in February of 1993, only
six months after she was convicted of shooting her abusive boyfriend. See Rob Karwath &
Hanke Gratteau, EdgarFrees Woman Who Killed Lover, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4,1993, § 2, at 1. In
addition, former Governor James Thompson released five women who killed or injured their
abusive husbands or boyfriends; none of these women have returned to prison. See Julie Irwin,
PardonsSought for 12 Women Who Killed Alleged Abusers, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1994, § 1, at
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community organizers, began to interview incarcerated women in the
fall of 1993.262 In February of 1994, petitions for twelve women were
submitted263 and a public hearing was held the following April."6
Governor Edgar released four of the women on May 12, 1994.265 By
the Fall of 1995, Governor Edgar had granted clemency to seven women
and denied petitions for at least seventeen more.2 6
3. Texas
In Texas, the impetus for releasing battered women came from the
legislature, rather than the governor. 67 In 1991, the Texas Senate
passed an act and resolution regarding battered women. The act allowed
direct and expert testimony on the relationship between the accused and
the victim in cases involving murder or manslaughter. 2' The
resolution directed the State Board of Pardons and Paroles to review the
cases of approximately forty Texans convicted of domestic violencerelated murder. 269 The Senate resolution was amended by the House
and enacted as a concurrent resolution, which read in part:
[The Texas criminal justice system has] jurisdiction over a
number of women and children who have been doubly
victimized first by their abusers and later by a criminal
justice system that failed to recognize the legitimacy of
their defense....
... These victims are not common criminals who killed
for profit or vengeance; rather, they ... were driven by an
262. Irwin, supra note 261, at 5.
263. Id.
264. See Laura Duncan, Project Seeks Freedom for Abused Women, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Apr. 6, 1994, at 1; Joseph C. Nunes, Show Mercy: Clemency Project Takes Up Cause of
Battered Women, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1993, § 6, at 1. The efforts met with disapproval from
some of the local media. See, e.g., Michelle Stevens, Justice Is Battered in Clemency Cases,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 11, 1994, at 19 (arguing that many of the petitions were of "questionable
merit" and did not represent "genuinely battered women").
265. Laura Duncan, Clemency Group Aims at Appeals Process, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May
13, 1994, at 3.
266. See M.A. Stapleton, Battered Women's Advocate Downplays Setback, CHI. DAILY L.

BULL., Oct. 9, 1995, at 1.
267. For a review of the Texas clemency procedures, see generally Meredith J. Duncan,
Comment, Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers and a New Texas Law, 29 Hous. L. REV.
963 (1992).
268. Act of Apr. 29, 1991, ch. 48, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 474 (codified at TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.06 (West 1993)), repealed by Act of June 19, 1993, ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3586, 3614.
269. S. Con. Res. 26, 72d Leg., 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3296 [hereinafter Domestic Violence
Resolution].
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unthinkable set of circumstances to perform this last
desperate act of self-preservation....
In view of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding
their crimes, these victims deserve an impartial review of
their sentences so that their histories as victims of domestic
violence are taken into account.27
The resolution asked the governor to direct the Board of Pardons to
investigate convictions and guilty pleas for murder or manslaughter
where the defendants were victims of domestic violence, with reviews
to be conducted with the help of the Texas Council on Family
Violence." 1 A similar measure had passed two years earlier, only to
be vetoed by then-Governor William Clements.272 Advocates hoped
that a female governor, newly-elected Ann Richards, would be more
sympathetic.273
Their hopes proved correct when Governor Richards signed the
legislation on May 16, 1991.274 In an attempt to avoid some of the
mistakes made by Governors Celeste and Schaefer, the resolution
directed that prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement officials be
consulted before any clemency decision was made.275 As Governor
Richards' spokesman made clear, "We don't want to do just a blanket
thing, which is where some people got into trouble in the past."27' 6
As each inmate requested a review, officials contacted both
prosecutors and the victims' families, who had thirty days to
comment.' 7 The inmate was then interviewed by a five-member panel,
which referred deserving cases to the full eighteen-member Board.278
Ten Board member votes in favor of clemency were required before the
case was sent to the governor, who made the final decision.279
Although inmates without documentation of alleged abuse could be

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Duncan, supra note 267, at 966.
273. See Maria Puente, Texas Considers Clemency: Will Review Cases Related to Abuse,
USA TODAY, May 17, 1991, at 3A (describing comments made by Debby Tucker, Executive
Director of the Texas Council on Family Violence).

274. Id.
275. Domestic Violence Resolution, supra note 269, at 3297. The resolution also directed
that a relative of the victim should be notified. Id.
276. Puente, supra note 273, at 3A (quoting Chuck McDonald). For a description of some
of the 40 women whom the Council wanted to consider for clemency, see Marcia S. Harrison
& Maria Puente, Convicted Women Describe Abuse, USA TODAY, May 17, 1991, at 3A.
277. UPI, Oct. 8, 1991, availablein LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
278. Id.
279. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [1994], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

heard by the panel, most women offered evidence of battering, including
police and hospital reports, letters from shelters, documentation of
counseling received prior to the killing, and eyewitness testimony.2 "'
By October of 1991, twenty-five women had requested reviews. 8'
Although the Texas approach looked promising, the results have been
disappointing. By the summer of 1993, parole officials had screened
over 400 applications from people convicted of murder or manslaughter
and had identified 123 women and 30 men who met the law's
criteria."' Almost a year and a half later, however, not a single
individual had been released. 3 In part, it appears that the timeconsuming requirement of obtaining input from court officials might be
responsible for the delay.2 84 However, with the defeat of Governor
Richards' bid for reelection 285 and the repeal of the 1991 act that
allowed expanded testimony,8 6 the prospects for future releases in
Texas are not promising.
4. California
One of the best-organized but most disappointing clemency efforts
has taken place in California, where an organized campaign has been
underway since 1991.287 The impetus for the effort was the
introduction of a successful 1991 bill allowing expert witnesses to testify

280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Cindy Rugeley, Freedom for Battered Women Proves to Be Elusive; No Prisoners
Have Been Released Under State Amnesty Plan, HOUSTON CHRON., July 11, 1993.
283. See Gayle Reaves, Abused Spouses Rebuffed, Clemency Yet to Be Granted in Slayings,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 22, 1994, at 31A; Rugeley, supra note 282. The Board of
Pardons and Paroles rejected 25 applications, and Governor Richards denied clemency for at
least three women who made it past the Board's screening. See Reaves, supra, at 31A (noting
allegations that Governor Richards may have turned down the three requests and let three others
languish "because of the political problem of looking soft on crime"). No reports of releases
were found by the author through November 1995.
284. See Rugeley, supra note 282. In addition, the Texas Council on Family Violence has
not been consulted on some recommendations, in contravention of the resolution. See Domestic
Violence Resolution, supra note 269, at 3297; Reaves, supra note 283, at 31A.
285. See Reaves, supra note 283, at 31A.
286. Act of June 19, 1993, ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3614.
287. See Madden, supra note 98, at 6; Richard Barbieri, Battered Women Push for
Clemency Program;Bay Area Counsel Establish Coalition to Aid Prisoners,RECORDER, Dec.
3, 1991, at 1. For an in-depth review of the clemency process in California, as well as a profile
of some of the prisoners seeking release, see Madden, supra note 98, at 4-15. For a recent
review of California self-defense law as applied to battered women, see Rachel A. Van Cleave,
A Matter of Evidence or of Law? Battered Women Claiming Self-Defense in California,5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 217 (1994).
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about BWS and admitting detailed evidence of prior abuse.288 Unlike
most of the other states, the clemency effort in California began with the
incarcerated women themselves.289 In March of 1991, thirty-four
women from the Frontera prison sent a clemency petition to Governor
Wilson,2 "° who agreed to review their cases and gave the women time
" ' In response, a group of San
to supplement their petitions.29
Francisco
lawyers formed the California Coalition for Battered Women in Prison,
hoping to provide lawyers for all the inmates requesting clemency.2"
Early in 1992, prison authorities agreed to the compassionate release of
one terminally ill inmate, who died two days later.293
The legislative effort was led by Assemblyman Jackie Speier (DSouth San Francisco), head of the Women's Caucus.294 In September
of 1991, ten state legislators traveled to the California Institution for
Women to hear from eight battered women imprisoned there.295 In
response, numerous domestic violence bills were introduced in the
Assembly, resulting in the passage of a law that explicitly included
BWS as one of the factors that the Board of Prison Terms may consider
during pardon and commutation proceedings. 6 By the end of 1992,
thirty-four formal petitions had been filed with the governor.297 Several
months later, the Assembly passed a resolution urging the governor to
launch an immediate investigation of the petitioners' cases.29"
When Governor Wilson finally began acting on these actions in the
spring of 1993, however, he left many advocates bitterly disappointed.
Of the fourteen petitions he considered, Governor Wilson denied all but
two: he commuted the sentence of Frances Mary Caccavale due to her

288. Act of Oct. 10, 1991, ch. 812, §§ 1-2, 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3182 (West) (codified
as amended at CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1995). California appellate courts
previously had upheld the admissibility of such testimony. People v. Ais, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167,
180 (Ct. App. 1989). Despite the exclusion of the testimony, however, Ais' conviction was

nonetheless affirmed. Id. at 183.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Barbieri, supra note 287, at 1.
Id.
Madden, supra note 98, at 6.
Barbieri, supra note 287, at 1.
Dan Moran, Ill Inmate Who Killed Abuser Is Released, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992,

at A8.
294. Patt Morrison, LegislatorsListen to Women Who Killed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991,
at A3.
295. Id.
296. See Act to Amend Section 4801 of the Penal Code Relating to Crimes, ch. 1138, §
1, 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4566 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1994));
Madden, supra note 98, at 19.
297. See Madden, supra note 98, at 7.
298. A. Con. Res. 10, 1993 Reg. Sess., 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. A-3 (West).
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'advanced years and deteriorated medical condition,' "and reduced the
sentence of Brenda Aris (whose unsuccessful appeal had resulted in the
judicial opinion admitting evidence of BWS in California). 99 In
justifying these decisions, Governor Wilson stated: "The test of whether
clemency should be considered in cases where the request is based on
B.W.S. must be: Did the petitioner have the option to leave her abuser,
or was the homicide realistically her only chance to escape?"3" While
advocates for clemency were dismayed by the decisions, others praised
Governor Wilson for his "restraint" and cautious deliberations."' By
the end of 1994, Governor Wilson had yet to take action on the
remaining petitions.
"

5. Other States
When Governor Celeste decided to commute the sentences of
battered women who killed their abusers, he was not acting without
precedent. Although his was the first mass clemency action, other
governors had granted varying forms of clemency to individual women.
For example, in March of 1989, the Nebraska Board of Pardons granted
a full pardon to Judy Sturm, fifteen years after she was released from
prison.' ° In September of 1989, the Nevada Parole Board freed Carey
Aratari after allowing her to seek parole.3"3 Illinois Governor James R.
Thompson commuted the sentences of Gladys E. Gonzalez and Leslie
Brown in January of 1989,"0 and Washington Governor Booth
Gardner released Delia Alaniz in October 1989.305 Several of the freed

299. Greg Lucas & Teresa Moore, Wilson Grants Clemency to 2 Battered Women: Petitions
Deniedfor 14 Other Female Prisoners,S.F. CHRON., May 29, 1993, at Al (quoting California
Governor Pete Wilson). Among the prisoners denied clemency was Brenda Clubine, founder of
Convicted Women Against Abuse, whom Governor Wilson said had "repeatedly lied" about her
husband's murder. See Deborah Hastings, National Spokeswoman For Battered Women: Is She
Telling the Truth?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1993, at B3.
300. Seth Mydans, Clemency PleasDenied in 14 Abuse-Defense Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 1993, at 21.
301. See, e.g., Mercy and Murder: Enduring Abuse Is Not a License to Kill, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., June 9, 1993, at B6. The author is not aware of any additional commutations
through November 1995.
302. See UPI, Mar. 16, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
303. See UPI, Sept. 25, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
304. Susan Diesenhouse, Women Driven to Kill Are Shown More Mercy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1989, at A10.
305. Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 45. According to the
National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, at least 17 women in 12 states had
been released prior to Governor Celeste's actions; between 1978 and 1993, the Clearinghouse
estimates that 80 women from 21 states were released. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE
DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN, BATTERED WOMEN WHO HAVE RECEIVED CLEMENCY: 1978-
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women had been convicted of hiring people to kill their abusive
mates.3 6
After Governors Celeste and Schaefer took action, advocacy groups
organized campaigns for large-scale clemency review in states such as
New York, where expert testimony about BWS has been admissible
since 1985.3 7 In March of 1991, an Assembly resolution was
introduced to urge then-Governor Mario Cuomo to direct the Parole
Board to " 'investigate the cases of all women convicted of murder or
other felonies which are directly related to domestic violence' " and to
recommend commutations or pardons when appropriate. 8 On March
25, 1991, the unanimous Assembly asked Cuomo to direct the Board to
consider the release of about 75 women.3 ' However, Cuomo exercised
his clemency power sparingly. He personally reviewed all applications
by battered women, and released only one woman by the end of
1992.31 °
Similarly, in late November of 1992 the Florida Coalition Against
Domestic Violence staged rallies in four cities and called for the state
Clemency Board to begin a review of an estimated three hundred
cases.3 1 In mid-December of that year, the efforts appeared to pay off:
BWS became admissible, and Governor Lawton Chiles and his Cabinet,
sitting as the Clemency Board, agreed to create a panel to review the
cases. 312 Kimberly Soubielle, the first woman to be released under this
program, had her sentence commuted to time served in March of
1993. 3" By the end of 1994, five women had been released, and the
1993 (Rev. May 1994).
306. For example, in December of 1988, New Hampshire Governor John H. Sununu granted
a conditional pardon to Kathleen Brewster Kaplan. Laura A. Kiernan, Pardon Grantedin N.H.
Murder-for-HireCase, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1988, at Metro/Region 29.
307. See People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
308. Gary Spencer, LegislatorsSeek Release of Women Prisoners,N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 1991,
at 1.
309. See Vivienne Walt, Battered Women in Jail; Assembly Urges Clemency for 75,
NEWSDAY,

Mar. 26, 1991, at News 3.

310. See Edward A. Adams, Cuomo Faces Annual Ritual of Deciding on Clemency, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 1 (noting that Cuomo had commuted the sentences of only 29 prisoners
in nine years as governor, including battered woman advocate Luz Santana, compared to more
than 150 commutations during his predecessor's eight years in office). However, Cuomo did
grant clemency to Jean Harris, who was convicted of shooting her lover, Dr. Herman Tamower,
of "Scarsdale Diet" fame. Deborah Sontag, Clemency Given Jean Harris Leaves 3 Others
Wondering, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1993, at Al. The author is not aware of any additional
commutations through the end of Cuomo's tenure as governor.
311. UPI, Coalition Wants Clemency for Abused Women, Nov. 27, 1991, available in
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
312. FloridaOKs "Battered Woman" Defense, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 19, 1991, at 21.
313. Clemency Grantedfor Battered Woman, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 11, 1993, at 5.
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Battered Women's Clemency Project had agreed to represent additional
candidates.314
The most innovative yet straightforward approach has been taken in
Washington state. In 1993, the legislature simply gave retroactive effect
to an existing law permitting convicted murderers to seek leniency
during sentencing by demonstrating that their victims abused them.3 15
In September 1994, this retroactive review resulted in the release of the
first such woman, Sharon Hanson.1 6
In total, organized clemency efforts have been reported in
approximately twenty-seven states.3" 7 Recently, at least one additional
governor has begun to review the case histories of battered women who
are in prison for killing their alleged abusers."' Women continue to
file individual petitions in other states as well. 9
314. Ron Bartlett, Women's Group Seeks Clemency in Slayings, TAMPA TRIB., at
Florida/Metro 1, Dec. 24, 1994, at 1; Bill Moss, Battered Wife Who Shot Mate Gets Clemency,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 15, 1993. Governor Chiles and his Cabinet have denied clemency
to at least one woman. See Bob Levenson, Battered-Wife Appeal Fails Again, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 15, 1993, at B1. The Clemency Project received a $300,000 grant from the
Florida Bar Foundation for a three-year review of women serving time for murder in Florida
prisons. Bartlett, supra, at 1. For a general description of the Florida clemency process, see Mark
R. Schlakman, Clemency and the Battered Woman, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1994, at 72. The author is
not aware of any additional commutations through November 1995.
315. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.395, 9.95.045, 9.95.047 (1993).
316. Battered Woman to Be Freed, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 2, 1994, at B2. Although the law
appeared to apply to a large number of inmates, the Washington Department of Corrections was
aware that only approximately 25 women were incarcerated for murders committed prior to July
of 1989. Barbara A. Serrano, Leniency for Those Who Killed Abusers, SEATTLE TIMES, June 18,
1993, at Al. Prior to passage of the law, Washington Governor Booth Gardner had agreed to
review individual cases but had declined to adopt a blanket plan of clemency. See Many
Battered Women-Ohio Governor Spares Convicted Murderers, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 12, 1991,
at A15.
317. See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN, CLEMENCY

ORGANIZING PROJECTS (Draft May 1994). For more information regarding clemency organizing
projects and current legislative proposals, contact the Clearinghouse at 125 S. 9th Street, Suite
302, Philadelphia, PA, 19107, (215) 351-0010.
318. See Patrick Crowley, Battered Wives May Be Pardonedfor Killings, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Nov. 14, 1995, at Al (outgoing Kentucky governor Brereton Jones instructed staff
to review case histories because "it's the right thing to do"). Not surprisingly, the announcement
engendered immediate criticism. See, e.g., No Pardon: Domestic Violence Is No Excuse for
Governor Jones to Release Killers, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 16, 1995, at A16 (editorial).
319. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 98, at 5-6; Robert S. Capers, Convictions of Abused
Women to Be Reviewed, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 17, 1992, at A22 (discussing Connecticut
efforts); Andi Rierden, Citing Abuse, Women Ask for Clemency in Killings, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 1991, § 12, at 1. Moreover, the recognition of domestic violence, and the debate over
punishment for battered women who kill, is not limited to the United States. See, e.g., Mary
Cummins, Domestic Violence-Will Men Get the Message?, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at 2
(discussing domestic violence public awareness campaign in Ireland); Bruce McKain, Ruling
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IV. THE JUSTIFLABILrY OF THE PARDONS
Governors Celeste and Schaefer advanced several broad reasons for
granting clemency,3" many of which have been echoed by subsequent
clemency efforts in other states. The most common reason was the
unfairness of the evidentiary laws under which the women had been
convicted. In Ohio, clemency followed changes to the evidentiary
" ' while in Maryland, Governor Schaefer simultaneously pushed
laws,32
for such amendments while undertaking clemency efforts." Other
reasons included: that the women posed no threat to the community; that
the women had been trapped in their battering relationships; that the
women had served enough time for their crimes; and that commutation
was the "right" thing to do and served the public interest." Whether
any of these reasons for clemency is justifiable under a system of
retributive justice is the question to which we now turn.
Should the imprisoned women have been left to the judicial system,
for retrial or re-sentencing by judges? Should large-scale sentencing
relief come only from the legislature? When governors take action
subsequent to judicial or legislative silence, or to nonretroactive changes
in the law, do they usurp judicial and legislative functions? Or is
clemency indeed an executive "check" on the power of the other
branches? Although a detailed discussion of separation-of-powers
doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note that
neither the existence of the executive clemency power nor the debate
over the scope of the separation-of-powers doctrine are new concepts.
To the extent that critics raised traditional separation-of-powers
arguments against the validity of the commutations, the object of their
wrath is more properly characterized as the concept of clemency in
general, rather than the individual actions in Ohio and Maryland.
However, to the extent that critics identified problems particular to the
governors' actions, their arguments merit further examination.
A. Theories of Punishment and Pardon
To say that clemency historically has been an executive prerogative

Will Renew Abuse Debate, THE. HERALD (Glasgow), July 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, PAPERS File (reporting decision of English appeal court to release battered woman
who killed her violent husband). For a discussion of international issues, see generally Dorothy
Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L.
REv. 1119 (1995).
320. See Leonard, supra note 19 (Celeste); Naylor, supra note 199, at Al (Schaefer).
321. See Kimmins, supra note 150.
322. Naylor, supra note 199, at Al.
323. Kimmins, supra note 150; Naylor, supra note 199, at Al.
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is not, however, to say that its exercise in these particular instances does
not offend or frustrate the goals of the criminal justice system. This
analysis in turn requires that such acts be measured against a generalized
scheme of criminal justice. In the current "law and order" environment
in the United States, modem versions of retributive theory (and at times
deterrence) most often are offered as the appropriate standards on which
criminal justice is based."
1. Development of Modem Retributive Theory
In general, a system of criminal justice exists "to make people do
what society regards as desirable and to prevent them from doing what
society considers to be undesirable."325 Yet despite that rather obvious
goal, historically there has been little agreement among scholars, judges,
politicians, and clergy as to how to achieve it.3" As a result, the
history of punishment has been marked not by a coherent approach to
criminal justice, but by the successive dominance of different, and
sometimes antithetical, approaches.
The oldest theory of punishment, and ironically the one to which
society most recently has returned, is retributive justice. 27 This theory,
often described as a theory of "just deserts," requires that every crime
be "repaid" in the form of punishment, with the proper amount of
punishment determined by the severity of the crime.328 Retributive
theories of justice can be traced back to the Code of Hammurabi, and
are exemplified by the Biblical instruction to take "an eye for an
eye. 329
In the United States, retributive theories were discredited in the early
twentieth century, and penal reformers instead turned their efforts
toward rehabilitation. 33' Rather than focusing on the crime,
rehabilitation focuses on "treating" the criminal, to enable the criminal
to return to society free from the desire to commit additional crimes. 33'
Unlike retributive justice, under which an appropriate sentence may be

324. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 68, § 1.5(a)(6).
325. Id. § 1.5.
326. Id. § 1.5(b).
327. Id.§ 1.5(a)(6).
328. Id.
329. See Exodus 21:24; MOORE, supra note 2, at 15-16. For consideration of theories of
retributive justice, see, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART
I OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (John Ladd trans., 1965); MOORE, supra note 2, at 28-34.
330. MOORE, supra note 2, at 56. For the progression from retributive justice through
utilitarianism, the "right to punishment," rehabilitation, and back to retributive justice, see id.
at 23-78.
331. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 68, § 1.5(a)(3).
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calculated for a given crime, the rehabilitative ideal provides no set
' Rather, incarceration lasts until each criminal
length of "treatment."332
is ready to return to society, resulting in the so-called "indeterminate
sentence. 333
By the 1960s, the attraction of the rehabilitative ideal began to
fade. 33 Despite the focus on treatment, consistent rates of recidivism
convinced many people that the system had failed. 5 More
importantly, reformers began to recognize that rehabilitation had
dehumanizing effects, most notably the uncertainty over how much time
a criminal would spend in prison and the wide disparity in sentences
imposed upon individuals who committed comparable crimes. 336 The
proffered solution was to move toward a system of determinate
sentencing that would reduce the discretion of the sentencing judge-in
other words, a return to the basic tenet of retributive justice that each
crime has an appropriate punishment. 7 The return to retributive
justice is perhaps best exemplified by the creation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, a codified method of calculating punishments
that explicitly rejected the goal of rehabilitation. 8
The new retributive ideal can be summarized as follows:
A just system of law imposes a fair burden of selfrestraining obedience on its citizens, offering them in return
the benefits that flow from the law-abiding self-restraint of
others. One who wilfully breaks the law of such a system
disturbs that fair balance of benefits and burdens....
Punishment restores that fair balance by imposing on the
criminal a burden which wipes out her unfair
advantage .... 339
332. Id. § 1.5(b).
333.
334.
335.
336.

MOORE, supra note 2, at 59, 69-72.
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 68, § 1.5(b).
MOORE, supra note 2, at 67.
Id. at 68-69. For a discussion of the legacy of rehabilitation theory in the United

States, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-67 (1989) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983)).
337. MOORE, supra note 2, at 74 (citing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS-REPORT OF THE COMMIrEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION

(1976)).
338. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-238, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3599 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991998 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367-68
(concluding that the Act rejects rehabilitation and serves the goals of retribution, education,
deterrence, and incapacitation).
339. R.A. Duff, Review Essay: Justice, Mercy, and Forgiveness, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
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Such punishment should be meted out fairly and in proportion to the
harm caused." Yet, while a retributive framework presupposes a
coherent analysis of fair and proportionate punishment, the concepts are
extremely difficult to quantify. 4 ' Thus, even among retributive
theorists, we might expect individual analyses of punishment (and of
clemency) to differ measurably.
2. Utilitarian Approaches
Retribution is by no means the only viable theory of punishment in
the late twentieth century. As our emphasis on the rehabilitative model
demonstrates, prevention of criminal behavior has been as much a part
of our criminal justice system as the imposition of appropriate
punishment for those who transgress. 2 Although the rehabilitation
model may have failed, the goal of prevention persists in the form of
deterrence: either "general deterrence," which aims to prevent members
of society from committing crimes, or "specific deterrence," which
focuses on deterring the individual criminal.343 Under a theory of
deterrence, the punishment inflicted on the criminal should "deter others
from, ,34committing
future crimes, lest they suffer the same unfortunate
4
fate.

Deterrence is a utilitarian theory of punishment justified by its
beneficial effects on society as a whole, rather than its effect of
balancing out the individual's crime. 5 Utilitarian theories focus on
the promotion of overall societal happiness; punishment is justified to
the extent that the gain to society outweighs the cost to the
individual. 346 As Professor Kathleen Dean Moore has noted, "[flor
Utilitarians, the punishment does not have to fit the crime, nor does it
have to fit the criminal. The punishment must fit only the needs of

Summer/Fall 1990, at 51, 51 (book review).
340. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 68, § 1.5(b), at 28; MOORE, supra note 2, at 104.
341. See MOORE, supranote 2, at 99-121. For example, in assessing how much punishment
is deserved, "legalistic retributivism" seeks proportionality in restoring a balance and reinforcing
obedience to the law, id. at 99-101, whereas "moralistic retributivism" measures punishment in
proportion to "moral turpitude." Id. at 108-09.
342. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 68, § 1.5(a)(1); supra notes 330-33 and accompanying

text.
343. LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 68, § 1.5(a)(1), (4).
344. Id. § 1.5(a)(4). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines explicitly adopted deterrence, as
well as retribution, as goals of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
345. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 36-37.
346. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 98, at 61. For a detailed discussion of utilitarian theory,
see, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); MOORE, supra note 2, at 35-45.
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society."" Thus, if retribution focuses on the nature of the crime, and
rehabilitation focuses on the nature of the criminal, deterrence and other
utilitarian theories focus instead on the needs of society. While empirical
studies have questioned the effectiveness of deterrence, particularly in
the context of the death penalty, it remains a powerful incentive for
punishment."'
In analyzing the propriety of the sentence commutations granted by
Governors Celeste and Schaefer, this Article takes as its reference point
the modem retributive theory of punishment. The main reason for this
choice is that retributive theories, unlike utilitarian theories, supply
detailed concepts of "desert" against which punishment, and hence
clemency, can be assessed. 9 Moreover, most of the criticism leveled
against the governors adopted the language of retributive theory,
questioning whether. or not these particular women deserved to be
released. However, in recognition of the ongoing viability of utilitarian
notions of punishment and pardon, this Article addresses issues of
deterrence where appropriate.
3. Justice or Mercy?
Before turning to an analysis of the clemency actions, it is worth
noting that there is a basic disagreement over whether clemency should
be characterized as "justice" or "mercy." For a strict theorist such as
Professor Moore, these concepts are mutually exclusive: "a justified
pardon is one that corrects injustice rather than tempers justice with
mercy." 3" Professor Moore rejects pardons granted for the public
welfare, to promote the pardoner's own welfare, to reward past actions,
or for the sake of pity, characterizing them as abuses of the pardon
power that cannot be justified on any retributive grounds.35 ' In this
view, "mercy is either justice or it is unjust"--it either advances the
goals of retributivism (in which case it is justice rather than mercy), or

347. MOORE, supra note 2, at 41.
348. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 68, § 1.5(a)(4), at 25 & n.27. Additional theories
of punishment, less relevant in the battered women context, include incarceration and education.
See id. § 1.5(a)(2), (5).
349. See id. § 1.5(a)(6), at 26. In addition, I agree with those scholars who contend that
retributive theory functions as a "limiting principle" on utilitarian theory; whereas deterrence
could justify the severe punishment of an individual with little (or even no) culpability if it
would deter others from committing a crime, retributive theory sets an upper limit on
punishment based on individual culpability. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 65-69 (1968); NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE
MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-26 (1980).

350. MOORE, supra note 2, at 213.
351. Id. at 199-207.
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it impedes them (in which case it is not appropriate). 52
Yet, in reality, clemency often has been granted for reasons best
described as "merciful." In the early nineteenth century, the United
States Supreme Court held that pardons were acts of grace which could
be refused by the recipient. 3 But if a pardon serves the goal of
justice, rather than mercy, it seems illogical to allow a prisoner to refuse
the pardon (and thereby to refuse to serve the goal of justice).
Interestingly, the Court eventually abandoned this "act of grace" theory
in favor of a model allowing pardons to be imposed for the public
good,354 a rationale that Professor Moore explicitly rejects. 55
However, even Professor Moore is willing to concede that other
retributivist scholars have come to differing conclusions regarding the
role of mercy in punishment. 6 For example, Professor Kobil presents
a broader vision of retributive justice that incorporates many elements
of mercy. Professor Kobil believes that most clemency decisions should
be "justice-enhancing," meaning that "they ensure that our penal system
'
operates fairly, so that each person is rendered her due."357
However,
he also would allow occasional use of "justice-neutral" clemency,
granted for reasons "ranging from preserving the unity of the state to
advancing the political or financial aims of' the pardoners.358 In
Professor Kobil's vision of clemency, the tension between these two
types of pardons would be solved by a procedural mechanism: justiceneutral clemency would be exercised by the executive alone, while
justice-enhancing decisions would be made by an independent
professional board.359
For other commentators, mercy is an autonomous value, and
clemency is best seen "as an instrument of equity in criminal law, a
means of preventing injustice and ensuring fairness for those wrongly
convicted or harshly sentenced." 3" Under this analysis, "[i]t is
precisely because the law defines justice narrowly ... that it can require
' Rather than creating a
genuine mercy to achieve genuine justice."361
conflict, such "mercy" strives to reconcile the results of an imperfect

352. See id. at 192.
353. See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833).
354. See, e.g., Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 485-88 (1927) (holding that the President
may pardon a person convicted of a life sentence without the convict's consent).
355. MOORE, supra note 2, at 199.
356. See id.at 188-92.
357. Kobil, supra note 36, at 622.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Johnson, supra note 44, at 114.
361. Id.at 117.
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criminal justice system with the retributive ideal.362
Some theorists attempt to reconcile the two goals by reconstituting
arguing that it is improper to consider
mercy as a form of justice and
"mercy" a separate concept.363 As a private creditor may waive a
personal debt, society as a whole, embodied by an official who
represents the victims who have a right to demand punishment, may
choose to waive the punishment that otherwise is deserved.3 These
considerations have led some retributive theorists to conclude that
justice and mercy are, and perhaps should be, irreconcilable; sometimes
we simply must choose mercy over justice. 5
The distinctions between individual forgiveness, mercy, and justice
are less important to utilitarian theories of justice."6 For utilitarians,
the appropriateness of punishment turns on a stark choice: Will the
punishment do more harm than good? 67 If so, punishment must be
imposed; if not, it must not be imposed. In that context, justice and
mercy have no inherent meaning and "their only moral content is that
they are names for withholding or softening punishment."3 Thus,
although utilitarianism can determine if punishment is generally
appropriate for a given class of crimes (e.g., whether battered women
who kill should be punished at all), it is less useful for analyzing
whether clemency is appropriate in an individual case.
B. When Should Clemency Be Granted?
Although such debates are engaging on a theoretical level, in practice
they often lead to disagreement over whether a particular act of
clemency is "justified" or merely an example of mercy. But by drawing
on the work of several such commentators, it is possible to discern and
articulate a number of categories of appropriate clemency. Ultimately,
it is my position that despite several theoretical obstacles, the acts of
Governors Celeste and Schaefer fit within several categories of

362. See id. at 115-16.
363. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162, 170-72 (1988). It is precisely this characterization
with which other commentators disagree, claiming that "[t]o eliminate the concept of legal
mercy.., because it is in most cases a means of doing justice is to ignore the message of
history," and to assume we have achieved a perfect system of justice. Johnson, supra note 44,
at 116.
364. Murphy, supra note 363, at 179-80.
365. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 363, at 111,
157-61.
366. MOORE, supra note 2, at 182-83.

367. Id. at 183.
368. Id.
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appropriate clemency.
1. Innocence
For a strict retributive theorist, executive clemency is most clearly
justified when the convicted person turns out to be innocent.3 69 Such
"innocence" is divided into two categories: those prisoners who have
been falsely convicted, and those who are not blameworthy due to some
type of reduced ability. 7 The false conviction argument raises the
almost intractable practical issues of how, and by whom, such
"innocence" can be established once appellate courts have upheld the
conviction (save for a later confession by the true perpetrator).371
However, this argument may occasionally be useful to those women
who can demonstrate that their legal guilt was determined in an
improper or unfair manner.372
In a strict analysis, reduced ability includes only the impairments of
insanity, mental retardation, and youth.373 With the exception of the
Burning Bed-type temporary insanity plea,374 this analysis is unlikely
to aid many battered women. But some commentators expand this
category to include other impairments that similarly diminish
blameworthiness, such as diminished mental capacity or intoxication.375
Under an expanded formulation, the learned helplessness component of
BWS may help to establish such diminished capacity, and Professor
Kobil explicitly defends the Ohio commutations on this ground.376
Governor Celeste alluded to this reasoning when he characterized the
women as "so emotionally entangled [that] they were incapable of

369. Id. at 132-33.
370. Id. at 138.
371. See, e.g., Ammons, supra note 10, at 31 (arguing that "[tihe possibility of mistake is
not as infrequent as one would suppose"). Professor Kobil defines "substantial doubt of guilt"
as any "reason that seriously undermines ... confidence in the integrity of the judicial
determination" and suggests that such offenders could be given a new trial. Kobil, supra note
36, at 624-25.
372. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 98, at 55-56 (discussing other factors that affect the
integrity of the judicial system including "[p]rosecutorial zeal, unwarrantedly stiff charges ...
unfair self-defense laws [and] the refusal or inability ofjurors to recognize the reasonable nature
of a battered woman's response to a fear of imminent harm"). On a practical level, however,
the argument that battered women never receive a fair trial is unlikely to sway public opinion
or to convince a wary state executive to act.
373. MOORE, supra note 2, at 138.
374. See supra note 66.
375. See Kobil, supra note 36, at 625-26.
376. Kobil, supra note 134, at 679 (claiming that the commutations were retributively
justifiable "because of the [women's] diminished psychological culpability").
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walking away." 3" But while this approach may satisfy retributive
standards for clemency, it relies heavily on culture-bound stereotypes of
helplessness, incapacity, and unreasonableness that battered women and
their advocates may prefer to avoid. 7
2. Excusable Conduct
If, under retributive theory, the purpose of punishment is to restore
society's balance by taking away the benefits unfairly gained by the
criminal, it follows that a criminal who does not receive any benefit
from her crime does not deserve punishment.379 Professor Moore labels
these situations "excuses," and they include both crimes without tangible
gain and crimes without any gain.8 The former category includes
unsuccessful attempts, crimes for which reparation has been made, and
crimes of compensation; the latter includes strict liability offenses and
coerced crimes. 8 It is possible to characterize a battered woman's
killing of her abuser as reparation or compensation for the injustice of
being battered.3" Yet this is exactly the type of vigilante action that
a law-abiding retributive system abhors;8 3 after all, it is the criminal
(the batterer), who is supposed to make amends. Not surprisingly, the
governors
did not cite this rationale as a justification for their clemency
384
actions.

A more appropriate excuse might be coercion, which can be
expanded to include physical and psychological necessity and
duress. 35 Particularly in light of new determinative sentencing

377. Colman McCarthy, Countering Violence at Home, WASH. POST, July 23, 1991, at D13
(quoting Ohio Governor Celeste). Yet this argument also requires an assertion that, despite their
earlier diminished capacity, the women do not pose a threat to the community at large.
378. See Schneider, supra note 116, at 220-22; supra part I.C.
379. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 142-44.
380. Id. at 143-44.
381. Id.
382. See Madden, supra note 98, at 56 (arguing that "we should not shrink from applying
the repaired crimes principle in battered women's cases merely because they involve death").
Even Madden, however, concedes that "fc]ommentators may shy away from this justification."
Id. at 56 n.281. This author does, although more out of doubt that this rationale serves to
advance the cause of clemency with decisionmakers than out of a lack of sympathy for the
sentiment it embodies.
383. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,308 (1972) (Stewart, L, concurring) (stating that
the criminal justice system promotes societal stability by deemphasizing "self-help, vigilante
justice, and lynch law").
384. Opponents, however, clearly attributed.this reasoning to the governors. See, e.g.,
Naylor, supra note 48, at Al.
385. See Kobil, supra note 36, at 630-31. Traditionally, the defenses of duress and necessity
were distinguished: necessity applied where the defendant's conduct was compelled by physical
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guidelines, judges may no longer have the flexibility to recognize subtle
distinctions in moral blameworthiness. 3 6 When Governor Celeste
described the women as "entrapped emotionally and physically, '387 he
evoked the image of such coercion. While this is an adequate reason for
clemency, Professor Kobil notes that "[p]articularly difficult issues arise
when the moral principles acted upon by the accused have no
widespread acceptance. ' 3' ss Thus, for decisionmakers without sympathy
for battered women, these cases may not appear to be compelling. The
same may be true of prosecutors, the media, and the general public.
3. Justified Conduct
Strict Kantian philosophers distinguish between "morally justified
crimes" (such as self-defense, mercy killings, or draft evasion during the
Vietnam War) and "morally appropriate crimes" based on sincerely held,
but possibly incorrect, moral beliefs." 9 A battered woman might argue
that she was morally justified in killing her abuser because he deserved
to die, even if her underlying belief as to just deserts is not shared by
the society at large.39° In Kantian terms, however, her action might

circumstances, while duress applied where the pressure came from another human being. See
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 68, § 5.4(b). However, the distinction has been eroded in many
jurisdictions, and is not particularly relevant to the present discussion. What is relevant is that
allegations of coercion that fail to establish a valid defense may nonetheless constitute an
"excuse" for the purposes of clemency, as they may in some jurisdictions constitute a reason for
imposing a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.12 (1994). For discussions of the law of duress as
applied to battered women, see, e.g., Beth I.Z. Bolard, Battered Women Who Act Under Duress,
28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 603 (1994); Susan D. Appel, Note, Beyond Self-Defense: The Use of
Battered Woman Syndrome in Duress Defenses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 955.
386. Kobil, supra note 36, at 631.
387. McCarthy, supra note 377, at D13 (quoting Ohio Governor Celeste); see also Tamar
Lewin, More States Study Clemencyfor Women Who KilledAbusers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1991,
at A19 (noting Governor Schaefer's comment that some of the women would probably have
been killed had they not acted).
388. Kobil, supra note 36, at 631.
389. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 157-62; Kobil, supra note 36, at 632.
390. Madden, supra note 98, at 57. Alison Madden argues "that there have long been
situations in which society at least accepted, if not approved of, moral actions that were not in
conformance with inadequate or unpopular laws." Id. at 58. In deciding whether a battered
woman's actions were morally justified, Madden would ask "whether a morally courageous
person in those circumstances, knowing what she knows, would have performed the same action,
evaluating all conflicting demands." Id. As a practical matter, however, arguing that a battered
woman is morally justified in killing her abuser (particularly when death is not an enumerated
punishment for battering) is unlikely to sway either public opinion or state executives. Moreover,
the argument that society has long approved of illegal but "moral" actions cannot explain why
the exercise of clemency in the cases of battered women has engendered such bitter criticism;
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have been taken without the requisite level of moral deliberation.391
Furthermore, this argument seems to be an even more pro-vigilante
version of the coercion argument detailed above, and easily could be
rejected by unsympathetic decisionmakers, the media, or the public.
A slightly different formulation of the justification doctrine expresses
the idea that people should not be punished for past conduct that is now
permissible.3" Empirical evidence suggests, not surprisingly, that the
systematic use of sentence commutations increases after relevant laws
are changed.393 Because Governor Celeste took action after both the
Ohio judiciary and legislature had changed the laws regarding expert
testimony, this is perhaps the strongest argument in support of the Ohio
commutations. While this approach suggests that we should give the
women a chance to present the excluded evidence before some impartial
decisionmaker, it also is problematic: it may, in effect, amount to giving
retroactive effect to explicitly prospective laws and judicial
decisions.394
4. Sentence Adjustments
If full pardons seem inappropriate in the battered women context,
retributive justice also identifies a variety of situations in which an
adjustment to the offender's sentence may be in order. 95 This is
particularly important for battered women, because most clemency
efforts have involved sentence commutations rather than pardons.3 96
While such commutations may look like impermissible exercises of
mercy, rather than justice, they may in fact meet retributive criteria.
A sentence reduction may be justified when the offender suffers
disproportionately.397 This category encompasses several distinct
subcategories, including situations where: (1) due to special
circumstances such as illness, extreme youth, or extreme age, the

if anything, it suggests that this is one type of action that society has not (yet?) accepted.
391. MOORE, supra note 2, at 162-63 ("[P]eople of good character do not merely do what
they believe is right; they also have an additional responsibility as moral agents to come to
moral decisions in certain ways.").
392. Duff, supra note 339, at 62 (citing the example of post-Prohibition pardons).
393. See Susan E. Martin, Commutation of Prison Sentences: Practice, Promise, and
Limitation, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 593, 606-08 (1983) (citing New York and Pennsylvania
examples).
394. See infra notes 434-39 and accompanying text.
395. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 143-44 (discussing instances where reduced sentences
can be justified under retributionist theory); Kobil, supra note 36, at 628-32.
396. See, e.g., Ammons, supra note 10, at 2-3.
397. Kobil, supra note 36, at 628-29.
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sentence is unfair;39 8 (2) compared with other participants in the same
or similar crimes (e.g., men who have killed their wives or lovers), the
offender's sentence was disproportionate;3 or (3) the sentence simply
is too severe.' While individual battered women have been released
due to special circumstances,"' it seems difficult to apply this
justification across the board. Of course, it is possible, although rather
extreme, to argue that any imprisonment is "too severe" given the prior
abuse. Perhaps a better application of this proportionality analysis can
be seen in Massachusetts, where the sentences imposed on battered
women traditionally have been longer than in other jurisdictions.'
Governor Weld's guidelines explicitly state that "a history of abuse
suffered by the petitioner at the hands of the victim" is a legitimate
reason to argue that "further incarceration would constitute gross
unfairness because of the basic equities involved." 3
Clemency may also be appropriate when the sentence is unrelated to
desert, such as when "there is a substantial likelihood that the sentence
was based on factors such as the race or gender of the criminal or
victim, rather than on the punishment the individual deserved."' The
governors themselves did not argue that the judge or jury's attitudes
toward battered women were so skewed as to reach this level of bias.
This argument, however, may be particularly useful for attorneys who
are concerned that their clients were convicted simply because they were
"bad" battered women.
5. Clemency for the Public Interest
Governors are charged with promoting the rather amorphous "public
welfare," which suggests that retributive justice need not be their only
motivation for clemency.: 5 Governor Celeste invoked this rationale

398. See id.
399. Id. at 627. For anecdotal evidence suggesting that women who kill their husbands
receive harsher sentences than men who kill their wives, see Lynn Hecht Schafran, There's No
Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063 (1995); Anna Quindlen, Court Rulings Back
Notion That Men More Valuable Than Women, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1994, § 1, at 19.
400. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 173-77; Kobil, supra note 36, at 627-30. Of course, this
leaves open the question of who should decide whether a sentence is too severe.
401. One example is California Governor Pete Wilson's release of terminally ill Birdie
Foley, a 53-year-old woman convicted of killing her abusive boyfriend; Foley died two days
after her release. See Gina Boubion, Battered Women Appeal for Clemency, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Mar. 1, 1992, at IA.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 245-46.
403. COMMUTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 248, at 1(c)(iii).
404. Kobil, supra note 36, at 629 (footnote omitted).
405. See Murphy, supra note 363, at 174 n.9 ("[Tihe chief executive.., might legitimately
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when explaining his second (more controversial) set of pardons, saying
" 'It is my hope and belief that in each of these cases the public interest
is served, not just the interest of the individuals involved.' "' A
similar rationale was used by Governor Schaefer to defend his decisions:
" 'We think after a thorough review of these [cases] that it's the right'
thing to do.' "'
There is stark disagreement among retributive commentators over the
appropriateness of clemency granted in the "public interest." As noted
above, Professor Moore rejects all exercises of clemency for the "public
good," while Professor Kobil would allow for some amount of "justiceneutral" clemency."' To some extent, the disagreement might be
traced to the lack of retributive standards for determining what serves
the "public good," short of imposing the full punishment that is
deserved for a particular crime. Yet in essence, and probably more
importantly, this is not a retributive rationale at all, but a basic
utilitarian approach: it is not in the public interest to impose punishment
that would do society more harm than good.'
Retributive theory may have room for the related rationale of
mitigating the results of unfair laws. The Maryland commutations, which
occurred almost simultaneously with the drive to amend relevant laws,
illustrate that "[f]requent pardons sometimes indicate areas in which
laws should be reconsidered by legislators."41' If for no other reason,
the governors' actions may be justified as a means of suggesting to the'

ignore the just deserts of an individual and pardon that individual if the good of the community
required it.").
406. See Celeste Commutes Death Sentences of Eight Murderers, supra note 177.
407. Naylor, supra note 199, at Al (alteration in original).
408. See MOORE,supra note 2, at 44-45; Kobil, supra note 36, at 636-38.
409. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 35-42. In addition to this basic theory, Bentham
developed several additional rationales regarding when punishment is not appropriate. See id.
at 40-41. According to Bentham, punishment ought not to be imposed: (1) when it would not
be effective in deterring crime; (2) when the crime has not caused any "mischief' or was
committed to prevent a greater harm; (3) when punishment is not needed because other
approaches, such as education or social programs, will stop crime; and (4) when it would cause
greater harm than not punishing the crime (for example, when a large percentage of the
population commits a crime such as draft dodging). Id. It can be argued that each of these
rationales fits battered women who kill. See Madden, supra note 98, at 61-63. But with the
exception of the deterrence and education/social program arguments, which appear to be
susceptible to empirical study, these rationales require a determination of the relative worth of
the batterer and his victim/killer-and we are far from being able to arrive at such a consensus.
410. MOORE, supra note 2, at 223. Of course, this does not address the problems that arise
when the legislature has rejected changes to the law, as in Maryland, or has effected a change
that is not retroactive, as in Ohio. At some point, we must consider the possibility that principles
of majority rule may dictate that the governor's ideas of "right" have been proved "wrong."
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" ' As Alison Madden has
legislature that existing law was unfair.41
noted, "Clemency can be used to rectify unjust results in individual
cases that have not been cured through the judicial channels upon which
we normally rely to accommodate changes in the law. It can correct
general failings of our criminal justice system that arise from inequities

in our society. 4

2

C. Obstacles to Exercises of Clemency
Given these myriad retributive and utilitarian justifications for
clemency, how do the Ohio and Maryland commutations fare? It seems
clear that, at least in form, the governors' rationales could fit within
several of these categories. From a justice-enhancing approach, the
commutations might be justified by the reduced mental capacity of the
offenders, the necessity or coercion leading to their crimes, the fact that
the evidentiary and/or self-defense laws were changed after the women
were tried or that the governor believed existing laws to be unjust, the
amount the women had suffered, and the disproportionate or severe
punishment imposed.413 From a mercy perspective, these reasons are
all the more compelling.414 From a utilitarian approach, the
commutations might be acceptable based on the "public good" even if
retributive justice was not advanced in any particular case.41

However, upon closer examination, there appear to be several
obstacles to justifying the commutations on either retributive or
utilitarian grounds: (1) questions of the separation of powers and
institutional competence; (2) retroactivity; (3) whether the women's
suffering "counts" for purposes of punishment; and (4) whether the
commutations serve the purpose of deterrence. Although it is my
position that these issues ultimately may be resolved in favor of the
commutation actions, each deserves to be addressed.

411. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 223.
412. Madden, supra note 98, at 2 (footnotes omitted).
413. See supra part IV.B.
414. See supra part IV.A.3.
415. In addition, the commutations served the overall retributive purposes of ensuring
proportionality and fairness in individual cases. Rather than standing for the extremist view that
battered women who kill do not deserve to be tried, let alone punished (or, as opponents would
phrase it, that battered women have a "license to kill" their abusers), the commutations were an
attempt to correct a particular group of cases in which the criminal justice system led to unfair
results. See Justice and Battered Women, supra note 162, at 18 ("[Flar from trying to teach an
ideological lesson in his last days in power, Celeste was trying to make up for a flaw in a
fundamentally fair justice system."). Although critics may disagree over whether the system truly
was unfair, the governors' goals are in harmony with the retributive ideal.
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1. Separation of Powers and Institutional Competence
As mentioned earlier, it may be argued that acts of executive
clemency violate the separation-of-powers doctrine by permitting the
executive to overturn decisions made by the judicial branch.416 Thus,
in Ohio and Maryland, opponents of clemency chastised the governors
for interfering with the proper workings of the judicial system.417 One
critic alleged that Governor Schaefer had "single-handedly overturned
the criminal justice system by ignoring the evidence from the
trials[,] the verdicts of the juries that convicted them and the sentences"
meted out by informed judges."1 In addition, the commutations could
be seen as usurping the power of the legislative branch to alter (or
refuse to alter) existing law, particularly where the Maryland legislature
had yet to pass the law admitting evidence of BWS at trial.4 19
In reality, these criticisms point to inherent weaknesses of executive
clemency in general, rather than particular errors made by Governors
Celeste and Schaefer.4" By definition, any grant of clemency interferes
with the judicial process, at least to a certain extent, by remitting a
portion of the punishment imposed by the judicial system. As long as
it is permissible for the executive to grant clemency when he or she
believes that the punishment in an individual case is unfair-be it
because the conduct was excusable or justifiable, the sentence was too
harsh, or the executive doubts the integrity of the conviction-there will
be an inherent conflict with the other branches of government.421 This
dilemma is at the heart of our system of government, in which the
traditional separation of powers coexists with a system of checks and
balances. After all, the ultimate exercise of the power of checks and
balances occurs not when the various branches are in harmony, but
when they disagree.
To say that this tension is inherent in the very existence of the
clemency power is not, however, to deny that there may be methods of
making the exercise of clemency more palatable and politically
accountable. Despite the existence of a substantial body of literature on
the topic, clemency has often operated as an arbitrary system, left to the
unguided discretion of the state executive.4' In fact, the Ohio and

416. See supra text accompanying note 26.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 168-72, 211-13.
418. The Gov Blunders Again, supra note 226, at G2.
419. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
420. See Ammons, supra note 10, at 46 ("The debate of whether clemency is an aspect of
justice or whether mercy is truly unmerited and therefore a gift is ageless and unresolved.").
421. Kobil, supra note 36, at 620.
422. See id. at 601 (claiming that "the exercise of the clemency power has been subject
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Maryland commutations are typical of clemency in general, not mere
exceptions to an otherwise tightly controlled process.423
A more interesting question is whether the executive is competent to
decide if clemency is appropriate in a given situation. While it may be
permissible under retributive theories to grant clemency to a person who
is innocent, or one who suffers disproportionately, is the executive really
competent to make such a determination, particularly when the judicial
system has reached the opposite conclusion after a fact-intensive trial
and several levels of appeal? In short, is there a way to insure that the
executive branch has the requisite expertise to make the practical
decisions needed to support a clemency decision?
Modem scholars have identified a lack of guiding principles for
clemency, and some have proposed to divide the power among several
branches of government.424 In response, several commentators have
argued that clemency is solely an executive function and cannot be
limited by the legislature.425 As Alison Madden argues:
[I]t seems clear from a constitutional and traditional
perspective that the final decision of a governor in granting
or denying clemency petitions is not subject to collateral
attack on due process grounds and is therefore final and
non-reviewable. In addition, the express delegation of the
power to the executive seems to resolve any separation-ofpowers problem in favor of the governor should the
legislature attempt to provide for solutions that significantly
restrict the governor's discretion or mandate clemency in
particular cases or situations.4 26

But this position ignores the fact that many states-including Ohio and
only to the constraints that each chief executive has chosen to impose upon himself'); Kobil,
supra note 134, at 670-71 (noting lack of statutory or administrative standards in Ohio).
423. See Madden, supra note 98, at 69-73 (discussing the Ohio and Maryland commutations
as examples of the clemency process).
424. See, e.g., Kobil, supra note 36, at 605-06, 622 (noting that "only a handful of states
have promulgated statutory or administrative standards" governing the exercise of clemency, and
suggesting a bifurcation of the clemency process between the executive and a professional
board); Martin, supra note 393, at 596-600 & tbl. 1 (providing data that describe the procedural
requirements for each state's clemency decisions).
425. See Hugo A. Bedau, A Retributive Theory of the PardoningPower?, 27 U. RICH. L.
REV. 185, 200 (1993); Philip P. Houle, Forgive and Forget: Honoring Full and Unconditional
Pardons, 41 ME. L. REV. 273, 295 (1989).
426. Madden, supra note 98, at 67. Madden's claim may be true of the federal pardon
power. See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (stating that with the exception
of impeachment, "[tihe power thus conferred is unlimited . . . [and] cannot be fettered by any
legislative restrictions").
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Maryland-do restrict the governor's exercise of clemency to certain
types of cases (e.g., noncapital cases), or require the governor to follow
certain procedures when exercising that power.427 Whether further
restrictions on the clemency power are permissible will depend on the
constitution and laws of each individual state.
Notwithstanding this debate, by employing particular commutation
strategies governors may make clemency decisions more palatable to
opponents. Both the Ohio and Maryland commutations involved
unilateral action by the executive branch, which may have been one
reason they engendered such hostility. In Massachusetts, Governor Weld
took action in a more limited way. By changing the published
commutation guidelines, rather than simply granting clemency, Governor
Weld provided advance notice to prosecutors and other interested
parties." Although Governor Weld's approach would not satisfy
opponents who reject the exercise of executive clemency as a whole in
these cases, it does create a more open process.
Even more interesting is the approach in Texas, despite its lack of
success. Due to a former governor's lack of sympathy for the issue, the
impetus for allowing clemency in battered women cases came in the
form of a legislative resolution.429 This approach was also influenced
by the Texas clemency procedures, under which the governor shares the
power with an administrative board and is less free to take unilateral
action than the governors of many other states.43° The Texas legislative
resolution announced to prosecutors and to the public that a broad
" ' It may thus have provided a
coalition stood behind the action.43
measure of legitimacy, or an appearance of solidarity, that the unilateral
Ohio and Maryland decisions lacked.
The origin of the clemency effort also may affect the remedy that is
sought. Typically, criminal convictions rendered by a trial court are
overturned via appeals to a higher court. It is true that a legislature may
authorize new appeals for women who were prevented from using
evidence which is now admissible, as Washington state has done. Such
appeals probably would result in retrials, unless an appellate court was
convinced that the excluded evidence was so overwhelming as to dictate
427. See Martin, supranote 393, at 597-600 tbl. 1 (tabulating state restrictions); supra notes
177-80 and accompanying text (alleging that Governor Celeste failed to follow procedural
requirements in granting clemency).
428. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
429. See Domestic Violence Resolution, supra note 269, at 3296.
430. See Martin, supra note 393, at 599. For example, Ohio and Maryland vest the final
clemency power in the governor alone, while Massachusetts, like Texas, forces the governor to
share clemency power with an administrative body. See Kobil, supra note 36, at 605 nn.232-33.
431. See Domestic Violence Resolution, supra note 269, at 3296-97.
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an acquittal. Yet while a retrial may be the only way to determine
conclusively that the woman would not have been convicted but for the
exclusion of the evidence, retrials are very costly. 432 Furthermore, even
with expedited appeals, the women would spend a fair amount of time
in prison while awaiting trial.
In contrast, the executive does not have the power to order
retrials. 43 3 But parole boards, which are executive bodies, have relevant
expertise in evaluating prisoners and deciding whether they should be
released.4 4 Moreover, the clemency conditions imposed by Governors
Celeste and Schaefer resembled traditional parole conditions: a minimum
amount of time spent in prison, domestic violence-related community
service, counseling, and monitoring by corrections officers for the
remainder of their original sentences.4 ' Thus, the governors used
remedies with which the executive branch has substantial experience.
These remedies are as appropriate for the executive branch as appeals
are for changes emanating from the judiciary. If executive clemency is
a valid approach, the remedies used by Governors Celeste and Schaefer
were equally appropriate.
2. Retroactivity
A distinct but related problem concerns the exercise of clemency in
a state such as Ohio, where the relevant legal and legislative changes
predated the commutations. At first glance, this might appear to be an
ideal situation for the use of clemency because both the judicial and
legislative branches determined that the evidentiary laws under which
the women were convicted were unfair and needed to be changed.
Unfortunately, neither the Koss opinion nor the new evidentiary law had
retroactive effect. 436 Thus, Governor Celeste's actions were necessary
precisely because the women could not otherwise receive the benefits
of the legal changes. But by granting clemency on the grounds that the
applicable law had changed, Governor Celeste in effect made those legal
changes retroactive, which was in direct conflict with both the
432. In Texas, where an estimated 250 women may qualify for review, the costs of retrying
all these cases would be astronomical. Puente, supra note 273, at 3A.
433. Ohio Governor Celeste admitted that commutation was the only way he could help
the women. See Leonard, supra note 19.
434. See Martin, supra note 393, at 595-96.
435. See, e.g., Naylor, supra note 48, at Al (noting that Governor Schaefer commuted
sentences to time served); Zorzi, supra note 224, at IA (stating that Governor Schaefer released
eight women on "supervised parole"); supra text accompanying note 164 (discussing Governor
Celeste's usage of parole, commutation, and community service requirements).
436. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson 1993); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d
970, 975 (Ohio 1990).
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legislative and judicial actions.
A full discussion of the interplay between retroactivity doctrine and
the executive clemency power is beyond the scope of this Article.437
At least one commentator has answered this criticism merely by noting
that "a governor's power to commute sentences is plenary and is not
contingent upon other factors."43' 8 However, it is doubtful that
Governor Celeste could single-handedly have made the legal changes
retroactive in direct contravention of the judicial and legislative
decisions. If this were the sole rationale supporting the commutations,
I agree that it would be problematic.
Yet it also is possible to view the commutations in tandem with the
legal changes, rather than simply as an application of the new laws. One
formulation of the "justified conduct" rationale for clemency states that
"we should not punish people for conduct that is no longer
criminal-for conduct which the legislature.., declared to be
' From this perspective, Governor Celeste can be seen
permissible."439
not so much as applying the new laws themselves to the incarcerated
women, but as using the executive power to extend the rationalebehind
those changes to similarly situated women who did not fall within the
scope of the changes.
This view is bolstered by the manner in which Governor Celeste
identified the women who deserved clemency. Rather than committing
the women back to the judicial system for another round of trials and
appeals (the traditional consequence of retroactive judicial decisions), he
conducted a separate analysis of the women's cases."' It seems clear
that Governor Celeste was not trying to duplicate the judicial process,
but instead was attempting to use the resources of the executive to
identify women whose convictions may have been unfair." While it
may be valid to criticize his procedures and to disagree with his
motivation, his actions did not necessarily constitute improper attempts
to make the relevant laws "retroactive" in the traditional legal sense.

437. For a discussion of retroactivity issues, see, e.g., Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the
States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State PostconvictionRemedies, 44 ALA. L. REv. 421
(1993); J. Richard Doidge, Note, Is Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation of
Powers?: Rethinking United States v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 910 (1994). Much of this
literature deals with the effect of "new" legal rules on collateral review, often in the habeas
corpus context.
438. Ammons, supra note 10, at 55.
439. Duff, supra note 339, at 62.
440. See Leonard, supra note 19.
441. Id. C' 'I believe these [women] were victims in a profound way and were denied the
right to present evidence.' ") (quoting Ohio Governor Celeste).
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3. Did the Women's Suffering "Count"?
One oft-quoted rationale for justifying the commutations is that the
women had "suffered enough" for their crimes." 2 But it often is
difficult to determine just what type of suffering "counts" for these
purposes. In a strict retributive analysis, the only relevant suffering is
that which results from, and is the consequence of, the crime itself.443
This may pose a major obstacle for battered women who kill their
abusers, because suffering due to the prior beatings is not a consequence
of the act of killing. In contrast, however, any suffering the women
endured because they killed the men they loved would be relevant,' 4
as would the length of time they served as punishment for their
actions." 5 The governors, however, mixed all of these reasons
together. 6
Some retributive commentators present a much broader formulation
of "suffering" that could include prior beatings." 7 Generally, these
commentators argue that mercy, as distinct from justice, may be a valid
reason for clemency:
[S]uffering tends to bring people low, to reduce them, to
humble them. If so, then enough equality may be restored
in order to forgive them consistent with self-respect. They
may not have severed themselves from their own evil acts,
but there is perhaps a sense in which they have been
severed." 8
Other commentators stress that mercy is proper when suffering explicitly
includes acts which are not the result of the crime itself: "[I]f a criminal
is suffering seriously ( ...the suffering need not itself be a result of his

442. E.g., Kobil, supra note 36, at 633.
443. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 170-71; Kobil, supra note 36, at 633 (limiting clemency
to cases where "the punishment that the offender deserves has already been inflicted as an
unintended result of the crime").
444. Grossfeld, supra note 245, at Metro/Region 1 (" 'I felt his soul go right through mine,
and I'll never forget the feeling that I had. It was the most horrible feeling in this world.' ")
(quoting Patricia Hennessy, who is serving an 18- to 20-year sentence for manslaughter in
Massachusetts).
445. See Leonard, supra note 19 (noting that some pardoned women were required to serve
a minimum sentence before their release).
446. Compare Naylor, supra note 199, at Al (claiming the women have" 'served enough
time' ") (statement of Maryland Governor Schaefer) with Lewin, supra note 174, at A17
(stressing that the women "were the victims of violence, repeated violence").
447. See, e.g., Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in MURPHY & HAMPTON,
supra note 363, at 26-27.
448. Id. at 27.
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crime), we might, and perhaps should, come to see him from the
perspective of compassion and mercy rather than from that of retributive
justice."" 9 Such a broad formulation could include the prior suffering
of these women at the hands of the men whom they killed. Thus, on
balance, it seems likely that prior suffering may be considered in
deciding whether the women have "suffered enough" to merit reductions
in their sentences.
4. Deterrence
Finally, a utilitarian approach to clemency requires that the
commutations comport with the goal of deterrence.450 In terms of both
specific and general deterrence, the question is complicated by a lack of
empirical evidence. Does the fact that battered women are punished
harshly for killing their alleged abusers deter some women from fighting
back? Or, as many advocates claim, is the "decision" to fight back. with
deadly force an emotional, split-second, reflex reaction that involves no
rational reflection and thus could not be deterred? 51 Viewing the
situation from another perspective, does the fact that battered women
who kill are granted clemency help to deter abusive men from further
beatings?
Opponents of clemency argued that these women posed a threat to
the community. Claiming that the commutations declared "open season
on men," 452 critics in Ohio and Maryland accused the governors of
endangering "public safety by turning loose criminals who belong
' Whether the commutations will induce more battered
behind bars."453
women to kill their abusers may be a subject for empirical study;
however, if allowing BWS to be raised as a defense at trial has not
promoted such violence, it seems unlikely that the commutations will do
so." In reality, only a fraction of total female inmates have been
released.455 Moreover, those who have been released have "done time"

449. Duff, supra note 339, at 59.
450. See Madden, supra note 198, at 60; supra text accompanying notes 341-46.
451. See, e.g., Kieman, supra note 95, at 1 (discussing specific instances of women who
killed their husbands in an immediate response to physical abuse). Alison Madden suggests that
women who kill are "not marauding, cold-blooded killers... likely to 'attack' again" but
merely victims who acted instantaneously in self-defense. See Madden, supra note 98, at 61.
452. Kay Bartlett, Spousal Homicide Law: "Open Season" on Men--or Domestic
Violence?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1991, at A33 (inner quotation marks omitted).
453. The Gov Blunders Again, supra note 226, at G2.
454. Abigail Trafford, Why Battered Women Kill, WASH. POST (Health), Feb. 26, 1991, at
6. Ammons, supra note 10, at 57 (noting that "there has been no wholesale killing of husbands
or lovers" since evidence of BWS began to be admitted).
455. Barbieri, supra note 287, at 1. Between 1983 and 1989, an average of 834 women per
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both in prison and on the front pages of national newspapers, watching
every unsavory
detail of their lives dredged up in the name of
"news." 45 6 On balance, these are hardly the fairy-tale stories that most
women want to emulate.
Beyond the general "license to kill" argument, there is a debate over
the women's futures. Are these women likely to fall into future battering
relationships? If they do, are these particular women predisposed to kill
again? Are they more likely to be killed or does the experience of
killing instead work to break the cycle of violence? A few of the
profiled women, such as Maryland's Mytokia Friend, had become
involved with their victims after previous abusive relationships,"' but
the general applicability of this pattern is far from clear.458
As with any group of people, it seems likely that some of the
individuals released may be dangerously violent. Prosecutors argued that
Virginia Johnson, who allegedly threatened a potential witness, was such
a woman; Governor Schaefer disagreed. 459 Rather than arguing against
clemency, this argument highlights the importance of comprehensive,
individualized reviews. Allegations of violence must be addressed on an
individualized basis, where reviewers can determine what relevance, if
any, the allegations have to the issue of clemency. However, once the
information is before the executive, the final decision must be respected.
V. BETTER APPROACHES TO CLEMENCY
In reality, when state executives consider whether or not to grant
clemency to battered women who kill, or when advocates plan their
clemency efforts, jurisprudential concerns are likely to take a back seat
to proverbial political concerns: 46 how should the clemency process
be structured so as to be politically (rather than philosophically) feasible,

year killed their husbands or boyfriends. Id. However, only about 80 women received clemency
between 1978 and 1994. Cynthia Hubert, Killers Win Clemency with "Battered" Defense,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 18, 1994, at Al.
. 456. In interviewing many of the Ohio women, Patricia Gagn6 found that "[a]ll expressed
the opinion that the media had exploited them and their cases and a desire to stay away from
any publicity about themselves." Gagn6, supra note 133, at n.15.
457. Naylor, supra note 195, at B9 (noting that this was Friend's second abusive marriage);
see also Grossfeld, supra note 245, at Metro/Region I (describing how Lisa Becker Grimshaw
of Massachusetts left another abuser for victim Thomas Grimshaw); Michael Slackman, Guilty
of Killing, She Got Leniency, NEWSDAY, Dec. 12, 1991, at News 3 (describing Christine
Watson's first abusive marriage).
458. See Walker, supra note 54, at 531 (stating that it is a popular myth that battered
women, after leaving one abusive relationship, enter into another).
459. See The Gov Blunders Again, supra note 226, at G2.
460. Ammons, supra note 10, at 29.
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and how can the media backlash be anticipated and minimized (if not
avoided)? Once again, the experiences in Ohio and Maryland are
helpful. As these experiences demonstrate, there may be ways of
structuring the clemency process so as to minimize the controversy and
blunt much of the criticism. To understand the criticism raised by these
clemency efforts, we must examine how, by whom, and on whose behalf
the clemency reviews took place.
Much of the criticism surrounding the decisions addressed the
selection and evaluation of candidates. 2 To a certain extent, these
problems are inherent in any clemency decision:
What kinds of evidence should [the decisionmaker] be
required to consider or to seek out? What procedures should
govern her decision? Should the prosecution be allowed to
argue that the conviction was justified? If we allow the
pardoner too much discretion.... how can we have
confidence in the justice of her decisions? If, on the other
hand, we impose on her the kinds of procedural constraints
by which the courts are bound, it begins to3 look as if we
are simply creating a new appellate court."
In Ohio and Maryland, the procedures used to identify and evaluate the
women were the subject of intense and hostile debate. Although
alternative procedures might not have contributed to the amount of
justice that was done, they might have made the entire process more
palatable.
A. Selecting the Candidatesfor Review
Once an executive has determined that battered women who killed
their abusers may deserve clemency, he or she faces the difficult task of
deciding which cases to review. Does the governor review the case of
every woman who could have presented evidence of abuse at trial? Does
the governor review only those cases involving women who attempted
to present the evidence but were not allowed to do so (or were only
allowed to present it in a limited form)? Does the governor review only
the cases of those women whose files contain allegations of abuse? If
so, should cases in which women admitted the abuse to their attorneys
461. Madden, supra note 98, at 52 ('The clemency power serves as a powerful and
necessary tool in an imperfect and all-too-human system of justice.... [R]ather than questioning
whether the power is consistent with our system, we should ask how the power can best be used
to augment our system of justice.").
462. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 233; The Gov Blunders Again, supra note 226, at G2.
463. Duff, supra note 339, at 61.
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but refused to testify about it at trial be reviewed? Moreover, in order
to be fair to women who kept the abuse secret, even from their
attorneys, should automatic reviews be made for any woman convicted
of killing a male intimate?
The actual review procedures have varied. In Ohio, Governor Celeste
asked his aides to review the files of women convicted of violent crimes
against spouses or companions who allegedly abused them.4" The
resulting cases were then presented to the Parole Board for review, with
Governor Celeste retaining final discretion.4 65 But such an open
approach, while it does reach a large group of women, may promote
inaccurate and culturally biased stereotypes, particularly when the
decisionmakers have no prior experience with battered women.4" For
example, the head of the APA stated that he wanted "the person who
has lived the life of abuse with no way out."'4 67 Few battered women,
particularly working women who hold down independent jobs, are likely
to meet such a condition.
In Maryland, the cases were brought to the governor's attention by
two advocacy groups. 46 In other states, the clemency process begins
by action of the inmate herself.469 In California, both of these
processes have proceeded simultaneously: while the group of Frontera
inmates sua sponte petitioned Governor Wilson for clemency, advocates
have expanded the search to other inmates.47 ° In states where formal
clemency procedures exist, requiring the women to request review may
reduce what opponents view as "frivolous" claims. Unless the clemency
procedures are widely publicized and targeted to all relevant inmates,
however, such "self-selection" may actually deter deserving women,
particularly those who most exhibit the effects of learned
helplessness. 471' The best approach may be that used in Washington
state, where the Department of Corrections notified all murderers
convicted prior to the effective date of the law permitting sentencing
leniency; the inmates then chose whether or not to submit their own
petitions.472
What should happen to women like Patricia Ann Washington, who

464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
at Al.

Wilkerson, supra note 153, at 11.
See id.
See Madden, supra note 98, at 74-75.
Pesce, supra note 154, at IA (quoting Raymond Kapotz) (internal quotes omitted).
See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.260 (West Supp. 1995).
See Hubert, supra note 455, at A l.
See Madden, supra note 98, at 74.
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 72.02.270 (West Supp. 1994); Serrano, supra note 316,
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told her attorney about the abuse but refused to testify about it at trial,
and stated under oath that her victim never hit her? 73 Governor
Celeste noted that denial is consistent with BWS "because these are
women who have spent their whole adult lives ... unwilling to face
'
what is happening'to them."474
This poses a dilemma: do we take such
statements at face value and risk excluding some genuinely battered
women, or do we paternalistically (and at great expense) insist upon
reviewing all cases where objective evidence of battering is found, even
if the women deny it? The most realistic solution may be to limit review
to those women who, like Washington, admitted the abuse to their
attorneys but were unwilling to describe the abuse in public.
B. Who Does the Review?
Clearly, the governor and the relevant administrative authority must
be involved in the review process. In Ohio, the review is done by the
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections; in Massachusetts, the
review is done by the Advisory Board of Pardons.47 But, given time
constraints and a lack of familiarity with battered women, it is tempting
to turn to outside advocacy groups. Sometimes hybrid groups like the
Texas Council on Family Violence, a private nonprofit organization
which receives state funding, have an explicit consultation role.476 At
the other extreme is Maryland, where much of the information was
reviewed and presented to Governor Schaefer and the Parole
Commission by two outside advocacy groups.4' These groups bore the
brunt of the resulting criticism; if Governor Schaefer lacked important
facts, critics claimed, it was because the advocates either ignored or
mischaracterized the information.47 Even the Washington Post claimed
that "[a]dvocacy groups have badly damaged their credibility by not
presenting the complete and unbiased record."4'79
Why Governor Schaefer and his aides lacked or overlooked relevant
facts, if indeed they did, is an unanswerable factual question. What is
clear is that the process, at least in retrospect, did not look unbiased, and
that the appearance of impropriety added to the furor over the
473. Duggan, supra note 228, at C4.
474. Lewin, supra note 174, at A17.
475. Kimmins, supra note 150; Wang Rong, Network Urges Release of Battered Woman,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1994, at City Weekly 4.
476. David Ellison, Women's Clemency Resolution Advances, HOUSTON POST, Apr. 13,
1991, at A21.
477. Shen & Schneider, supra note 211, at B2.
478. See David Simon & William F. Zorzi, Jr., Doubts Raised on Freeing Women Who
Have Killed, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 17, 1991, at A20.
479. The Commuted Sentences, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1991, at A18.
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unprecedented "mass" clemency actions. We thus confront a real
dilemma: the expertise that advocacy groups possess is essential to the
fair review of cases, but too close an involvement in the process may
suggest bias." The best solution may be to allow these groups to
participate in some capacity, while reserving the ultimate review for a
governmental body or perhaps for an existing state-funded expert
"'
organization.48
C. What Information Must Be Reviewed?
By far, the greatest amount of criticism was directed at the
information which the governors chose to review before coming to a
decision. 2 The governors were chastised for not reviewing trial
transcripts, not notifying prosecutors, judges, and the victims' relatives,
and ultimately being too quick to accept allegations of abuse.8 What
follows is a brief analysis of some of the information that opponents of
the commutations wanted to examine. Note, however, that claims of
"incomplete" information easily can be conflated with outright rejection
of the relevance of prior battering; opponents who refuse to
acknowledge that BWS has any bearing on culpability presumably
would reject clemency under any review process, no matter how
detailed.4"
1. Review of Trial Transcripts
Governor Schaefer was criticized for his refusal to review the trial
transcripts.8 His supporters had a compelling argument: the clemency
review was designed to consider evidence which was excluded at trial,
and therefore would not appear in the transcripts. 86 But a review of
the trial transcript would have informed Governor Schaefer that Patricia
Washington, for example, had denied prior abuse at trial. 8 7 The value
of preventing such surprises may well outweigh the general redundancy
480. Cf generally Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (describing tension over the role of bureaucratic agencies).
481. Professor Kobil goes a step further, suggesting that there be a review by an
independent professional board established either by the executive or the legislature. Kobil,
supra note 36, at 622-23. Even so, expert organizations could have an advisory role.
482. See Duggan, supra note 231, at B1, B2; Lewin, supra note 174, at A17; Simon &
Zorzi, supra note 478, at A20.
483. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 174, at A17.
484. See, e.g., Ammons, supra note 10, at 55-61 (discussing prosecutorial arguments against
the use of clemency for battered women).
485. See Duggan, supra note 231, at B2; Lewin, supra note 174, at A17.
486. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 174, at A17.
487. Duggan, supra note 231, at B2.
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of the transcripts. Moreover, to the extent that executive review is
designed to approximate the trial as it should have occurred, it must
examine evidence that was admitted as well as that which was excluded
from the original trial.
2. Notification of Prosecutors, Judges, and Families
Perhaps the most vocal criticism came from prosecutors, who
objected that neither they nor the trial judges had been notified of
potential commutation actions.4"' Governor Celeste responded that he
was not required by law to do so;489 Maryland corrections officials
responded that their review took account of the prosecutorial viewpoint
through a presentence report and a brief prosecutorial summary.4"
Officials also stressed that because the women had been convicted, the
trial record necessarily reflected the view of the prosecution.491
The general trend, however, is to require notification of both
sentencing judge and prosecuting attorney, and sometimes the victim's
family, during the review.4" For example, the Texas Senate resolution
required that prosecutors, police, and judges be consulted before the
decision was made.493 In Massachusetts, the Advisory Board must
notify the Secretary of Public Safety and the appropriate District
Attorney before the public hearing takes place; in homicide cases,
notices of the hearing must be published in a local newspaper.494 Even
in Ohio, the APA is supposed to notify the prosecutor and judge of the
pending application.495 These recommendations may be highly
influential in the ultimate clemency decision."
Of course, whether the input of judges and prosecutors provides
useful information is a different issue from whether it is politically
advisable. If the law clearly prohibited the admissibility of BWS
evidence, and the defendant made no effort to introduce that evidence
in other ways, the judge should have no knowledge of the prior
battering and any evidence considered by the judge at the sentencing
stage should be in the record. As Professor Moore notes, the clemency
process has the virtue of taking into account information that the judge

488. See Lewin, supra note 174, at A17.
489. See id.

490. Id.
491. Id.
492. See Martin, supra note 393, at 596.
493. Domestic Violence Resolution, supra note 269, at 3296.
494. See COMMUTAnON GUIDELINES, supra note 248, §§ 5(a), (c).

495. Id.
496. Id. at 596.
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does not know, especially "factors that have a moral significance,
though they may lack a legal one: factors related to the whole life of the
offender, his motives, and his circumstances." 4" While it may be
persuasive for a judge to state that an offender deserves clemency in an
unusual case, as a practical matter we should expect judges, based on
the information to which they have access, to arrive at the opposite
conclusion.49
Professor Moore notes that "[i]t is even more of a mystery why the
prosecuting attorney's recommendation would justify pardon."4
Prosecutors may in fact have investigated the issue of battering during
trial preparation, even if it was not litigated. Moreover, institutional
pressure to obtain a conviction may have led the prosecutor to disregard
or undervalue such evidence."° The pressure to continue to disregard
such evidence may be intensified during clemency proceedings, when
the very integrity of the conviction is questioned."'
The best argument for including prosecutors and judges in the review
process is a-practical one: inclusion may lessen the resulting hostility
when clemency is granted. Sue Osthoff, Director of the National
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, admitted as much
after the Maryland experience:
"[W]e've learned a lot. I do not see it as the role of the
governor to retry these cases. But if it's helpful to get extra
information or if it's politically valuable to get prosecutors
involved in the process, and if all of this protects women
from having to be left out on the limb in the press, then we
have to try it all. ' '5°
Similar arguments can be made regarding notification of the victims'
families. Although such notification is required by both the
Massachusetts and Texas procedures, 3 it is not clear that the families
possess relevant information that did not already come out at the trial
stage. However, allowing the survivors to express their opposition to the
clemency application may well be preferable to the alternative:
encouraging them to vent their frustration and disgust in the media when
497. MOORE, supra note 2, at 208.
498. See id.
499. Id.
500. See Madden, supra note 98, at 34-36.
501. See Ammons, supra note 10, at 60.
502. Baum, supra note 233, at El (quoting Sue Osthoff, Director of the National
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women).
503. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 4B (West 1995); Domestic Violence
Resolution, supra note 269, at 3297; COMMUTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 248, § 5(h).
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the governor's action catches them unprepared.
3. Corroboration
Both Governors Celeste and Schaefer were criticized for failing to
"corroborate the histories of abuse cited by the women. ' ' "°4 While the
actual content of the evidence presented in Maryland is protected by
executive privilege and privacy statutes, commission members stressed
that the review was "not dissimilar to what goes on in a courtroom."" 5
The types of corroborating information used by Ohio and Texas were
quite extensive and included hospital records, letters from counselors
and shelters for battered women, police reports, and eyewitness
testimony. 6 Assuming the Maryland evidence was similar, it is
difficult to imagine just what additional "corroboration" could satisfy the
critics.
A related question is what type of evidence suffices to disqualify a
particular woman from clemency consideration. Critics stressed that
many of the women had financial motives for the killings, and that some
allegedly planned the deed in advance." But advocates note that
"even the most horribly abused women might have some sordid, and
deeply unsympathetic facts in their case histories." ' 8 For example,
Bernadette Barnes paid the hit man out of the proceeds from an
insurance policy on her husband's life, leading prosecutors to call it a
simple contract killing."° Yet the House of Ruth stressed that the
policy was seventeen years old, and Governor Schaefer was convinced
that the money had not been a driving force behind the murder. 1 This
demonstrates that, even if the reviewing authority is provided with all
relevant evidence, he or she must also be given the discretion to weigh
that evidence. And opponents may not like the decision.
D. Providing a Reasoned Explanation

.

In order to make a comprehensive assessment, the executive must
review all the relevant information for each individual case. As the

504. Simon & Zorzi, supra note 198, at 7A.
505. Id. (quoting Paul J. Davis, Chairman of the Parole Commission).
506. Only Guilty, supra note 21, at B4.

507. See Lewin, supra note 174, at A17.
508. Id. Tracy Huling, policy director of the Correctional Association stated, "One of the
problems with these cases is that everyone expects the perfect clean victim... and no one is
perfectly clean." Id.
509. Simon & Zorzi, supra note 198, at 7A.
510. Lewin, supra note 174, at A17.
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above discussion makes clear, it may also be wise to seek out less
relevant information (e.g., from prosecutors) in order to make the
process more acceptable to the public. Finally, once the decision is
made, the executive should set forth the reasons for granting clemency
in each case."' Many states, such as Ohio, already have such a
requirement, but it often is overlooked." 2 A disclosure requirement
makes the executive accountable for his or her decisions; it should
facilitate true retributive justice, both in practice and in the minds of the
public. Whether accurate or not, a secretive process appears to be an
improper one.
VI. CONCLUSION

Many lessons can be learned from the commutations in Ohio and
Maryland of battered women convicted of killing their abusers, and from
the efforts in other states to refine and expand the clemency process.
Although subjected to intense criticism, the actions of former Ohio
Governor Celeste and former Maryland Governor Schaefer met accepted
retributive and utilitarian criteria for exercising the clemency power. 13
Yet the tremendous controversy that followed these efforts cannot be
ignored. Responding to the criticism is important, because it directly
affects whether, and in what form, clemency efforts are able to succeed
in other states. I have argued that certain procedures, particularly
obtaining the input of prosecutors and judges involved in the case, may
make the ultimate clemency decisions more palatable, even if these
procedures do not increase the amount of "justice" that is done in any
individual situation. More publicly acceptable procedures may lessen the
risk to other governors in taking such action, enable advocates to mount
more acceptable campaigns on behalf of individual women, and allow
the women who are released to return to their private lives as soon as
possible.
Clemency, by its very nature, is a limited and often temporary
remedy for injustices suffered at the hands of the criminal justice
system.514 While, sadly, we are unlikely to exhaust the supply of
battered women who need assistance, the same cannot be said of

511. See Kobil, supra note 134, at 696.
512. See, e.g., id. at 696-97.
513. See supra part iv.C.
514. But see Madden, supra note 98, at 41 ("[Clemency efforts] should not be seen as a
'one-shot' effort to cure unjust results perceived to have occurred only because a woman did
not introduce expert opinion testimony on the battered woman syndrome at trial. Clemency in
battered women's cases should be used as long as necessary to correct unjust results when
battered women who kill abusers are convicted despite the fact that they acted in self-defense.").
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battered women who killed their abusers before evidence of BWS was
admitted. At some point in the future, it is likely that all such women
will receive clemency, be denied clemency, or be released from prison
after serving their sentences or while on parole. These women are likely
to be replaced by others who have been convicted even when testimony
regarding BWS was admitted at trial. For this reason, it is important that
both decisionmakers and advocates for battered women look beyond
clemency efforts and evidentiary changes, to the ultimate goal of
preventing domestic violence.
We are now in a unique position to take action on the problem of
domestic violence. The Violence Against Women Act has provided
needed funding, training, and enforcement mechanisms. 5 The trial of
O.J. Simpson-despite its outcome-is likely to keep the topic of
domestic violence in the media and on our minds. Moreover, the
clemency actions in Ohio and Maryland have provided valuable
guidance about when, and how, clemency efforts can work. There may
never be a better time to address all the facets of domestic violence:
prevention, enforcement, education-and justice.

515. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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